Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 23

The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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1.         SFL094324, Heidgger Jr v Alves Dissolution

Petitioner’s motion to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories, further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, and monetary sanctions is GRANTED. 

            On February 9, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses and Sanctions.  Respondent filed a Responsive Declaration to the Request for Order on May 28, 2026, that the Court finds to be completely disingenuous.  Petitioner submitted substantial evidence in the moving papers confirming that Respondent was represented by counsel throughout the discovery process.  Respondent’s prior counsel was appropriately engaging in meet and confer communications to cure the defects of the discovery responses and said communications were attached as exhibits to the moving papers in this action.  Respondent’s counsel did not sign a Substitution of Attorney to be removed from this case until May 21, 2026, which was subsequently filed with the Court on May 28, 2026.  It is clear from the correspondence that Respondent promised to provide the missing discovery and has failed to do so without any justification.  The attempt to portray herself as a self-represented litigant who is struggling through this process is clearly untrue and has created a scenario in which Petitioner has unnecessarily incurred fees as a direct result of Respondent’s lack of cooperation in this matter. 

            Respondent is ordered to produce the further responses to Form Interrogatories without objection within the next 20 days.  Respondent is ordered to produce the missing documents in response to the Request for Production of Documents, Set One within 20 days.  The Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the sum of $14,400 as sanctions for her failure to act in good faith in the discovery process.  Said sum is payable within 180 days and legal interest accrues at the rate of 10% per annum.

 Petitioner shall prepare and submit an order consistent with this order within 10 days of the hearing date in this matter. 

2.         24FL00304, Brinkerhoff Dissolution

Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Sanctions GRANTED.  Sanctions of $1,225 awarded to the moving party against Petitioner. 

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with two minor children (the “Children”) on February 14, 2024.  Petitioner sought joint legal and physical custody as well as visitation rights. 

            The parties entered into a stipulation and waiver of final declaration of disclosure which Petitioner filed on April 18, 2024, the same day on which both parties filed a declaration (the “PDD Declaration”) regarding service of preliminary declaration of disclosure (“PDD”).  Petitioner then filed a request to enter default on April 23, 2024 based on the fact that the partiers had reached a written marital settlement agreement (the “MSA”) resolving the issues in the litigation.  On May 16, 2024, the court entered judgment (the “Judgment”) based on, and incorporating, the MSA. 

            Up through the time of the entry of Judgment, both parties were self-represented.  Both parties after that obtained counsel who substituted into this action.  However, Petitioner’s attorney withdrew from representing her on July 28, 2025, leaving Petitioner once again self-represented. 

            Petitioner filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside Judgment, moving the court to set aside the Judgment on the basis that the parties did not exchange preliminary declarations of disclosure (“PDD”) and the attorney who assisted them both in the negotiations had failed to complete all of the relevant paperwork.  Respondent herself also asked the court to set aside the judgment on the same basis.  The court granted that motion after the hearing in May 2025.

Discovery

            As explained in the Declaration of Attorney Rebecca Dao Cornia in support of the Motion to Compel filed on February 11, 2026 (the “RDC Dec.”), Respondent served Petitioner on November 20, 2025 with Demands for Production (“RFPs”) and Form Interrogatories, along with a blank Schedule of Assets and Debts (“SAD”) to complete (collectively, the “Discovery”).  Responses were due by Friday, December 26, 2025.  Petitioner electronically served the responses on Sunday, December 28, 2025, making them untimely.  In response to some of RFPs, Petitioner generally agreed to produce responsive documents if she located any but she provided no documents and did not identify any documents in response to the demands.  She also did not provide a completed Schedule of Assets and Debts (SAD) with the interrogatory responses.  Respondent sent Petitioner a meet-and-confer letter detailing what Respondent considered to be deficiencies, asking for new responses, and including another blank SAD for Petitioner to complete.  Petitioner then sent an electronic copy of her SAD on January 19, 2026, but it did not include any required disclosures.  Respondent sent another e-mail to Petitioner on January 27, 2026 to inquire about documents which Petitioner had promised in her RFP responses.  The next day, Petitioner delivered “a box half full of documents” but these were not labeled and a review showed that they were not responsive to the requests and were instead mostly old account statements from 2020.  Respondent received a message from Cenaida Guzman (“Guzman”) on February 2, 2026, stating that Respondent was too busy to communicate and seeking a response to a partial settlement offer, to which Respondent stated that no settlement evaluation was possible absent the discovery sought.  The court notes that Guzman appears to be a legal secretary form a law firm, but that Petitioner is not represented and was not at the time of the discovery issues, so the court is unaware of the involvement of Guzman or the law firm.  Petitioner then responded that she would produce no bank statements, and she has provided no new responses or documents. 

Motion

            Respondent in her RFO and Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses and Sanctions moves the court to compel Petitioner to provide further responses to specified RFPs and interrogatories, produce requested documents, identify relevant custodians of record, and pay monetary sanctions of $1,662.50 for attorney’s fees and costs.

            There is no opposition and the deadline for filing and serving opposition has passed.

 

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

When a propounding party is dissatisfied with responses to interrogatories or requests for production or inspection (“RFP”), that party may move to compel further responses.  CCP sections 2030.300, 2031.310. The moving party must make adequate attempts to meet and confer.  Ibid.  Generally, once a timely, proper motion to compel further responses has been made, the responding party has the burden to justify objections or incomplete answers.  Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221. 

            A party moving to compel further responses to a production request must demonstrate “good cause" for seeking the items.  CCP section 2031.310(b)(1).  This requires a showing that the items are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and a showing of specific facts justifying discovery.  Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.  Whether there is an alternative source for the information is relevant though not dispositive.  Associated Brewers Distrib. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 588.  Once the moving party demonstrates good cause, the responding party must justify its objections.  Kirkland v. Sup.Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.

A party has a duty to provide “complete” responses and to make them as straightforward as possible.  CCP sections 2030.220; 2031.210-2031.230.  Requests must be answered to the extent possible and an answer that contains only part of the information requested or which evades a meaningful response is improper.  Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783. 

            A responding party has a duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to obtain the requested information and if it is unable to comply, it must state that it made a reasonable and diligent search.  CCP sections 2030.220 2031.230; Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 783.

            CCP section 2031.220 governs a statement of compliance with a production request.  It states, in full,

A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.

            CCP section 2031.230 governs responses containing a statement of inability to comply. 
 

It states, in pertinent part,

A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand… shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.
 

Failure to provide a timely response waives objections, “including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product….”    CCP sections 2030.290, 2031.300. 

Further Responses vs. Production / Promised Documents
 

Where a party has failed to respond to a request for production or the responses are considered inadequate, the first step is not to compel production but, as with interrogatories, to compel a response, and only once a party has obtained a response agreeing to produce items may the party seek production in compliance with that response.  CCP sections 2031.300, 2031.310, 2031.320.

Where the responding party agrees to produce the documents, things, property, or information requested, but then fails to do so, the party seeking discovery may move to compel production of the promised documents, information, or things.  CCP section 2031.320.  As with a motion to compel for failure to respond, there is no deadline and no meet-and-confer requirement.  Ibid.  The moving party must merely show that the responding party failed to comply as agreed.  CCP section 2031.320(a); see also Standon Co., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903.

Discussion

Objections
 

Preliminarily, given that Petitioner submitted some objections in her responses, the court notes that pursuant to the above authority, Petitioner waived objections by failing to respond by the deadline.

Further Responses to RFPs
 

            Respondent first seeks further responses to RFPs 1-6, 8, 10-11, 13-22, 27-34, and 36-38.  These seek a variety of financial records, documents about insurance policies, lawsuits to which Petitioner has been a party, agreements for Petitioner’s benefit, and the like.  All of these, in short, seek facially relevant information regarding Petitioner’s finances and property interests.  In response to all, Petitioner posited basic objections but agreed to produce documents.  The substantive agreement to produce documents varies slightly among some of them, but they are largely the same.  In all, Petitioner made only a vague promise to conduct a diligent search and a vague agreement to produce any documents if she found them.  She provided no other information, statement of ability, or whether she has in fact made such a diligent search.  She also has not provided any indication of whether such documents may exist, or what specifically she may or may nor produce.  These responses fail to comply with the requirements, set forth above, that she has made a reasonable, good-faith effort to obtain the requested documents and if she is in fact unable to comply.  There is no indication whether she will produce anything or what the parameters of such production will be.  These responses are deficient.  The court GRANTS the motion as to these.  

            Respondent also moves the court to compel further responses to RFPs 40-44, in which she seeks financial records for business ventures, gift tax return information for gifts from Petitioner, financial records held by another individual or entity in which Petitioner has a beneficial interest, and any other documents on which Petitioner intends to rely at trial, including property declarations and the like.  Petitioner provided no response to these at all.  The court GRANTS the motion as to these. 

            Regarding RFP 39, seeking documents reflecting accounts receivable, unsecured notes, tax refunds, or liability not otherwise produced, Petitioner responded that there was not a demand numbered 39 and objected to it on this basis.  She provided no other response.  Respondent demonstrates that there was in fact an RFP 39.  The court GRANTS the motion as to this item. 

            RFP 45 seeks documents regarding the health of the parties’ minor children.  Petitioner objected that the request is so uncertain and unintelligible that she cannot determine the nature of the information sought or what the subject matter is.  Respondent notes first that Petitioner waived all objections by failing to respond by the deadline and argues that Petitioner knows who the children are and should understand the term “health” as a common word.  Respondent is correct that Petitioner waived objections by failing to respond on time, as noted above.  She is also correct that, in any case, the request appears basically understandable.  The court GRANTS the motion as to this. 

            Respondent asks the court to compel Petitioner to supplement her responses to RFPs 7 and 9 by identifying the relevant custodian of record.   In these, Respondent seeks paystubs or other records of income, sources of income or monies, including gifts, repayment of loans, sale of assets, disability benefits, and more as specified in the requests.  Petitioner merely objected that the information is equally available to Respondent and then stated that she agrees to make a diligent search but that no such documents are in her possession, custody, or control.  Respondent notes that Petitioner’s source of income is a company over which she has sole control and that the company issues paychecks to Petitioner and employees, so Petitioner must know of such documents or who the custodian is.   The responses are incomplete.  The court GRANTS the motion as to these. 

Production of Documents
 

            Respondent also seeks production of responsive documents.  However, such relief is at this time premature.  As explained above, a party may not obtain an order compelling production until it has received a response agreeing to produce documents.  Petitioner did agree to produce documents, but only if she were to find any.  As discussed above, Respondent seeks further responses regarding the promise to produce and the sufficiency of a search.  Petitioner’s current responses do not indicate if there are any responsive documents.  However, Respondent is entitled to an order that Petitioner produce any responsive documents which in her responses she indicates that she has located and is able to produce.  To that extent, the court GRANTS the motion on this point. 

Interrogatories
 

            Finally, Respondent moves the court to compel Petitioner to provide further responses to form interrogatories 7, 10, 11, 13, and 15-17.  These seek information on income, contentions regarding property characterization, claims for reimbursement, and insurance, and ask Petitioner to complete the SAD.  Petitioner objected that they seek information equally available to Respondent, or vaguely claims that they seek information provided already “during our initial divorce proceeding.”   She otherwise provided terse, incomplete substantive responses which did not provide the required information sought.
 

            The court GRANTS the motion as to these. 
 

Sanctions

            For compelling further responses, the court shall impose monetary sanctions on the losing party unless that party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make sanctions unjust.  CCP sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2030.300, 2031.310.  In order to obtain sanctions, the moving party must state in the notice of motion that the party is seeking sanctions, identify against whom the party seeks the sanctions, and specify the kind of sanctions.  CCP section 2023.040.  Sanctions are limited to the “reasonable expenses” related to the motion.  Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.

            Respondent seeks sanctions of $1,662.50 based on 7 hours spent and 2.5 anticipated a “Modest Means” hourly rate of $175, below the attorney’s usual rate of $300.  RDC Dec., ¶¶ 9-10.  This results in $1,225 for the time spent already and $437.50 for the time anticipated.  These sanctions are reasonable, but the court can only award sanctions for the time both reasonably and actually spent, so cannot include the anticipated 2.5 hours until Respondent shows that she has in fact incurred that amount.  The court AWARDS sanctions in the amount of $1,225, against Petitioner.  It may award more according to proof. 

Conclusion
 

            The court GRANTS the motion as set forth above.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

3.         23FL00010, James v Lozinto

Petitioner Renee James (“Petitioner”) has initiated this action to establish parental relationship between the minor child Nikki Sophia Shay (“Minor”) and Respondent, Eric James Lozinto (“Respondent”). This matter is on calendar for the motion by Petitioner to compel genetic testing. The motion is GRANTED.

1. Facts and Request for Order

Petitioner initiated a case in King County Superior Court in Washington state (the “Washington Court”) to establish nonparental custody of the Minor (the “Washington Case”). On October 31, 2012, the Washington Court issued a custody decree as to Minor, granting Petitioner, as Minor’s maternal grandparent and full-time caregiver, full custodial rights to Minor (the “Washington Order”). Minor’s biological mother, Ashton Shay (now Ashton Wilson) appeared in the case and was granted limited visitation. Respondent was named in the case as an alleged father and was notified of proceedings, but refused to appear or be genetically tested. The Washington Order concluded that because paternity could not be established, Respondent had no legal rights to access or visit Minor. At the time, Petitioner and Minor lived in Washington, and Respondent was a resident of California.

Petitioner filed this action to establish parental relationship on August 31, 2023. Respondent was served with the Petition on March 21, 2025. On August 13, 2025, Petitioner filed a request for order for genetic testing to establish the genetic relationship between Respondent and Minor. According to Minor’s Biological mother, Respondent is the Minor’s biological father. Petitioner’s filings indicate that she (and presumably Minor) have relocated from Washington to the state of Kentucky. Respondent filed an opposition to both the Petition and the motion for genetic testing on December 4, 2025, asserting that due to the existence of the Washington Court’s order, this Court cannot rule on the issue of parentage.

2. Governing Law

Personal jurisdiction in family law cases is governed by principles of due process, including requiring that a respondent has sufficient contacts with the forum state showing that jurisdiction is appropriate. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 618. This includes issues of support and parentage. David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 365. California courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” CCP, § 410.10. Domicile within a state is sufficient to show that personal jurisdiction is appropriate. Milliken v. Meyer (1940) 311 U.S. 457, 461.

When interpreting the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), the court must look to the whole act, not narrowly at a specific provision. Griffith v. Gibson (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 465, 470. “There is a compelling state interest in establishing parentage for all children.” Fam. Code, § 7570 (a)(1); Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 123 (citing Fam Code § 7570 in the UPA context). 

“(I)n a civil action or proceeding in which parentage is a relevant fact, the court may, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person who is involved, and shall upon motion of any party to the action or proceeding made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, order the woman who gave birth, the child, and the alleged genetic parent to submit to genetic testing.” Fam. Code, § 7551.

3. Jurisdiction

Respondent contends that this Court does not have jurisdiction, as there was previously an action in Washington state where Petitioner was given custodial rights over the Minor. Respondent argues that the Minor does not reside here, Petitioner does not reside here, and that the Washington Case maintains jurisdiction over the matter of parentage.

First, it is apparent that the Washington case made no determination of parentage as to the second Parent. Respondent is extensively named throughout the decision provided. The Washington Order names no other alleged parent. The Washington Order states that Respondent is living in California at the time. While the Washington Order does not state that it lacks jurisdiction over Respondent, it also notably does not state that it does have jurisdiction, nor does it name another person as Minor’s legal father. Not only was Respondent, as he argues, never a party to that case, Petitioner’s election to further pursue this action in Respondent’s home venue is appropriate under jurisdictional principles. The Washington Order does not claim to adjudicate Respondent’s parentage of the Minor. Therefore, the Court interprets this as the Washington Court declining to adjudicate the issue either due to a lack of jurisdiction over Respondent or simply refusing to take jurisdiction over the issue of parentage. Neither would preclude this Court from addressing the issue as there has been no adjudication of the parentage issue.

There is also a flaw in Respondent’s reasoning when examining the purposes of the Uniform Parentage Act. There is a statutorily established interest in parentage being established under California law. Fam. Code § 7570(a)(1). Respondent was not required to submit to the Washington Court’s jurisdiction. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 618. However, Respondent may not refuse to participate in the Washington Case due to a lack of personal jurisdiction, then in turn avoid jurisdiction when the action comes to his home venue. Respondent’s residency in this venue is enough for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Respondent’s position, if adopted, places Petitioner and the Minor in the unacceptable position of requiring that they relocate the Minor to this venue in order to pursue Respondent’s possible parentage. Alternately, Respondent’s position requires Petitioner to fruitlessly pursue the action in Washington, which does not have jurisdiction over him. Neither appears in the interest of the child, nor is it reflective of any of the law governing jurisdiction. Petitioner does not need to show that she received an order from the Washington Court transferring the matter here. All this Court needs to find is that it has jurisdiction over the Respondent and the subject matter, and that no other court currently has jurisdiction.

As to the instant motion, subject matter jurisdiction appears clear. Parentage matters are within the jurisdiction of the Court. Fam. Code § 200. Jurisdiction over issues such as child custody is assessed at the time the determination is sought. Fam. Code § 3421. While the Washington Order may have had jurisdiction over parentage when it was decided, at the time of Petitioner’s instant motion filed in August of 2025, Washington’s jurisdiction has clearly ended. The child no longer resides in the state of Washington. There is no evidence in the record reflecting that any other court has jurisdiction over Respondent, and accordingly, no other court is in the position to adjudicate parentage. See, e.g., Fam. Code § 5700.205 (describing continuing exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA); Fam. Code §§ 3421, 3423 (jurisdiction under the UCCJEA). Accordingly, the record reflects that this Court appears to be the only available court in which to litigate the issue, in spite of Minor residing in another state.

While Respondent contends he is not Minor’s father, he provides no factual basis for that argument. Biological mother has averred that he is the child’s genetic parent. Genetic testing to determine biological parentage therefore appears appropriate.

4. Conclusion

Petitioner’s motion for genetic testing is GRANTED.

The Department shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).  As the County of Sonoma DCSS has now intervened in this matter any future hearings regarding this matter shall be set in Department 20. 

4.         SFL67922, Barnsdale Dissolution

            On March 23, 2026, Petitioner/Mother (hereinafter “Mother”) filed a Request for “Order to Compel Respondent’s compliance co-parenting/reimbursement.”  As this request was framed as a motion to compel it was set on the law and motion calendar.  This dissolution action was initiated in 2014 and has been a very high conflict case since the inception.  As it relates to the pending motion to compel, on February 5, 2026, Respondent/Father (hereinafter “Father”) was ordered to pay Mother the sum of $4,492.59 as reimbursement for various expenses incurred by Mother on behalf of the children.  Father was ordered to provide any reimbursement claim he may have against Mother within days and if he failed to provide reimbursement claims within 30 days, any claims through 2/5/26 would be deemed waived.  Father was also ordered to pay the reimbursement ordered to Mother within 30 days at which time interest will begin to accrue at the legal rate of 10% per annum.  Mother has already received the order she seeks.  The Court reiterating an order that already exists does not make it anymore enforceable.  Mother has also requested that Father be compelled to participate in the counseling he has already been ordered to attend.  Again, reiterating an order that already exists does not make it more enforceable.

             On May 28, 2026, Father filed a late Responsive Declaration to the pending motion disputing the amount of the reimbursement order which was entered on February 5, 2026.  Father is untimely in his objection as the litigation regarding the amount of reimbursement occurred in February 2026 when the order was entered, and the only issue pending at this time is the payment on the existing order.  Mother is strongly encouraged to seek legal advice regarding the enforcement of an existing order for financial reimbursement.  Mother may submit a wage and earnings assignment order as to amounts already ordered. 

            The Court notes that Mother filed a Declaration on June 2, 2026, after Father’s Responsive Declaration wherein she raised issues that are not properly before the Court regarding a CPS intervention with their family.  If Mother is requesting the Court make orders regarding a current custody issue she is required to file and serve an appropriate action.               

5.         SFL086569, Troedel Dissolution

            Petitioner’s request to bifurcate the marital status and enter a Dissolution of the Status of the Marriage filed on April 8, 2026, is GRANTED.  The Respondent was served with the Request for Order, and no opposition was filed.  The Petitioner shall submit a Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage consistent with the provisions set forth in the moving papers pursuant to Family Code section 2337.  Said Judgment shall be submitted within 10 days of the hearing date on this matter.

6.         25FL02091, Raich v Raich

The motion to seal the entire action is GRANTED.

Facts

            Petitioner commenced this action by filing a request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) against Respondent, her ex-husband on October 6, 2025. 

            Petitioner claimed that the Subpoena would require her to risk violating a non-disparagement clause (the “Clause”) which was included in a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) between the parties in their Alameda County action for marital dissolution (the “Dissolution Action”) and which the court in that action subsequently included in the court order in September 2007.   That Clause states, in full, “Each party agrees not to disparage the other to anyone. If asked to comment on the other person, his/her past or present performance in any capacity related to Angel Wings or in any other capacity, the person shall either speak positively about the other or decline to comment.”

            Respondent subsequently filed an “anti-SLAPP” special motion to strike the DVRO request which was granted. 

Motion

            In his pending Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Seal The Entire Court File, Petitioner moves the court to seal the entire court file of this action or to strike it and remove it from the record, and require all future filings in this action to be filed under seal.  Alternatively, he moves the court to strike or seal or otherwise remove from the record all “false or irrelevant portions” of the file… in violation of the non-disparagement agreement and confidential Doe designations.”  He relies on California Rule of Court 2.550.  He contends that the statements do not relate to, or demonstrate, any wrongful conduct by him and Petitioner has admitted that the parties entered into the non-disparagement Clause which requires Petitioner to be silent about him or only speak positively about him.  He adds that there is significant prejudice from allowing the record to remain unredacted and unsealed places him in a false light because the matters should never have been filed in the first place. 

There is no opposition and the deadline for filing any opposition has passed.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022.

California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 2.550-2.551 govern sealing and unsealing records by court order.  CRC 2.550.  CRC 2.550(c)-(e) set forth factors to consider with respect to sealing court records.  Subdivision (c) states that “[u]nless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.”  Subdivision (d) lists express factual findings that are necessary to seal records.  These are: 1) there is an overriding interest overcoming the right of public access; 2) the overriding interest supports sealing the record; 3) a substantial probability exists that not sealing the record will prejudice the overriding interest; 4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and 5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.  Subdivision (e) governs the content and scope of the order.  It states that the order to seal records must specifically state the facts supporting the findings; order sealed only those documents or pages that contain the material that should be sealed; and may appoint a referee if the records are voluminous.  

             

CRC 2.551 governs the procedures for filing records under seal.  According to subdivision (b), a party requesting that the court seal a file must file a motion or application including a memorandum and declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing.  The party must serve copies of the moving papers on all parties who have appeared in the case.  In considering whether to unseal a record, the court must consider matters addressed in CRC 2.550(c)-(e). 

According to the Supreme Court in NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178. 1217, “substantive courtroom proceedings in ordinary civil cases are ‘presumptively open’ and that [CCP] section 124 must be interpreted to preclude closure of proceedings that satisfy the high court's historical tradition/utility considerations-unless two things occur,” the court giving notice to the public of contemplated closure if closing a proceeding, and a hearing to determine if overriding considerations support closure or sealing.  The court noted, at 1222, fn. 46, that courts have found there to be overriding interests where sealing is necessary to ensure a fair trial, protect trade secrets or attorney-client privilege, and the like. 

The court in Overstock.Com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, at 510, found that the trial court should have redacted or sealed confidential information which was irrelevant to the litigation at issue.  Specifically, it found that various pieces of evidence presented in papers in relation to a motion for summary judgment contained information which was confidential and yet also irrelevant to the motion and that the trial court erred in denying a motion to seal and redact the irrelevant confidential information from the records.  The court of appeal noted that the trial court should have stricken or redacted the information. 

Lack of Opposition

            As noted above, Petitioner has filed no opposition to this motion and the deadline for doing so has passed.  After Respondent had already filed a reply noting the lack of opposition, and after the deadline for opposing the motion had passed, on May 29, 2026, Petitioner filed an application to continue the hearing on the basis that Petitioner’s counsel has a trial set for the same day.  The request made no other assertions.  The court denied that request.  The request to continue is also unclear and confusing.  It makes no mention of what hearing or RFO it addresses, other than the hearing date, which implies that it addresses the motion to seal.  However, it states that Petitioner is the party who filed the RFO which is the subject of the hearing which she seeks to continue, indicating that she seeks a continuance of her own RFO, but there is no such matter pending.  

Request for Judicial Notice

            Respondent requests judicial notice of the parties’ MSA with the Clause entered in the Dissolution Action of Angel McClary Raich v. Robert Raich, Alameda County No. RF06-276817, as well as the judgment and order entered in that action.

            These documents are court records.  The court may judicially notice these documents, their contentions, and their purported legal effect.  To this extent, the court grants the request. 

Discussion

            The Court is persuaded that the records in this action should be sealed and remain sealed until such a time, if ever, that there is a contrary court determination.  Although not all of the information presented is confidential, irrelevant, groundless, or in violation of the Clause, the overall nature of this litigation and the bulk of the statements in the records are.  Petitioner’s claims and the supporting information violate the Clause.  More importantly, this court has already found that Petitioner’s claims are, at their very core, improper litigation based on valid rights of Respondent and access to the courts.  Respondent prevailed in full on that very basis and the litigation has been concluded entirely in Respondent’s favor.  Petitioner herself has also made no effort to oppose the motion.  Given the circumstances of the parties involved, the MSA and its Clause, and the nature of the allegations as well as the disposition of this action, there are strong interests in overcoming the right of public access.  By contrast, in part due to the nature of the disposition with the court’s ruling in the special motion to strike, the court can see no significant public interest which would warrant keeping the file unsealed and open to public access. 

            That said, the court finds insufficient basis for ordering the entire case file to be purged or stricken from the court record.  The court instead finds it appropriate to order the entire action, and all filings in this action, to be sealed until any court determination to the contrary. 

Conclusion

            The court GRANTS the motion as explained above.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

7.        25FL02610, Popov v Popoff

The motion for attorney’s fees filed by the Protected Party on May 1, 2026 is GRANTED.

            On April 22, 2026, a Domestic Violence Restraining Order After Hearing was issued against the restrained party Victor Popoff following an evidentiary hearing wherein the Court found the restrained parties request for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order against the protected party was retaliatory and was denied.  On May 1, 2026, the Protected Party filed a request for attorney fees as the prevailing petitioner in a domestic violence action pursuant to Family Code §6344(a).

             Pursuant to the statute the Court “shall issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner” in a domestic violence action.  Pursuant to subsection (c) of the same statute, the court “shall first determine pursuant to Section 270 that the party ordered to pay has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay.”  The restrained party filed a Responsive Declaration to the pending attorney’s fees motion on May 8, 2026, wherein he asserts that the Restrained Party is required to file an FL-150 so the Court can “evaluate the relative financial circumstances of the parties.”  The court is not required to evaluate the relative financial circumstances of the parties under an order entered pursuant to Family Code §6344(a).  That evaluation is required under Family Code §2030 where the request for fees is based on the needs of the party, and the pending request is not a request under that statute.  Rather, the basis for these fees is specifically related to the mandatory fees provision for a prevailing petitioner in a domestic violence action.  The Restrained Party further argues the reasonableness of the fees and costs associated with this action.  The Court finds that the fees and costs incurred by Petitioner/Protected Party in this matter are reasonable and total $10,593.39.

             On April 29, 2026, Restrained Party filed an Income and Expense Declaration wherein he declared under penalty of perjury that his prior job ended on February 10, 2026.  His Income and expense declaration is woefully incomplete as it fails to indicate the amount of his prior salary, fails to include the average monthly salary he earned for the last 12 months including the period of time he was employed, and indicates that he has not filed taxes since 2024.  At page three of the Income and Expense Declaration, the Restrained Party does list his “estimated expenses” as $5,435 per month and does not indicate any debt or installment payments. 

            Based on this information provided directly by the Restrained Party, the Court finds that the Restrained Party has income or resources sufficient to pay monthly expenses of $5,435 per month and therefore is reasonably likely to have the ability to pay the attorneys fees in the amount of $10,593.39 incurred by Protected Party to pursue her domestic violence restraining order and unnecessarily be required at the same time to defend against the Restrained Party’s “retaliatory” request for a domestic violence restraining order against her.  This Court has grave concerns that the Restrained Party will continue to use the legal process in objecting to the requested fees while at the same time not being forthcoming in his own Income and Expense Declaration to further harass the Protected Party and cause her to incur additional fees to respond to his gamesmanship. 

            The motion of the Protected Party is GRANTED.  The Restrained Party is ordered to pay her the sum of $10,593.39 within 180 days and interest will accrue at the legal rate of 10% on any outstanding amount. The Protected Party is ordered to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this order within 10 days of the date set for hearing.  

8.         25FL01272, Thomson Dissolution

Appearances required.  This matter was previously on calendar on May 1, 2026.  Petitioner was advised that his pension is required to be joined pursuant to Family Code §2337(d)(1) prior to judgment granting dissolution of the status of the marriage.  As of this date, the joinder has still not occurred.   

**This is the end of the Tentative Rulings.***