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Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 23

Law & Motion Calendar

The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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Law & Motion Tentative Rulings

November 13, 2026

1.         24FL00773, Reedy/Reedy Disso

TENTATIVE RULING:

Motion to Compel Preliminary Disclosure (FL-142 and Related Documents) DENIED without prejudice with respect to the requests to compel financial documents and for attorney’s fees and costs, as explained further in this order.  APPEARANCES REQUIRED on all other issues.  The parties may, when appearing, address all issues present in the motion.  

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor children (the “Children”) on April 15, 2024.  Nothing further occurred, and Respondent did not appear, until Respondent filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) regarding spousal and child support, visitation, custody, and exchange of Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure (“PDD”) on January 29, 2026.  Both parties were present at the hearing on April 1, 2026 and the court entered various orders, primarily regarding, visitation, and care of the Children. 

            Petitioner filed her FL-141 Declaration Regarding Service of Declaration of Disclosure and Income and Expense Declaration (“Service Declaration”) on May 22, 2026, showing that she had served Respondent with her PDD, Income and Expense Declaration (“IED”), and related documents on May 21, 2026.

            Respondent filed his FL-141 Service Declaration on July 16, 2026, showing that he had personally served Petitioner with his PDD, IED, and related documents on July 10, 2026.  He filed his response to the petition on July 31, 2026.

Motion

            In her RFO and Motion to Compel Preliminary Disclosure (FL-142 and Related Documents), Petitioner moves the court to compel Respondent to serve her with his PDD, IED, and FL-142 Schedule of Assets and Debts (“Schedule”), along with related documents.  She also seeks various orders regarding the obligations for the mortgage, escrow, related issues, as well as new orders regarding support.  She seeks attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Family Code section 2030.    After the court continued the matter prior to the original hearing, she filed a supplemental declaration stating that although Respondent had by then served her with his financial documents, they were incomplete and appear to be inaccurate and missing required attachments.  

            Respondent oppose the motion, asserting that he had already provided his financial documents and that he, in any case, has just sent new, updated documents with additional information.  With the opposition, he filed a new IED and Service Declaration showing service of updated document on October 29, 2026.    

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

            The governing law requires disclosure of income and expenses, as well as assets.  Fam.Code sections 2100-2107; Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App. 4th 1470, 1476-1477. 

Unless excused, parties in actions under the Family Code must provide preliminary and final declarations of disclosure meeting the requirements set forth in Fam. Code sections 2103, 2104, and 2105.  If a party fails to provide a disclosure or the required information, the other party may request compliance and, if the party still fails to comply, may then bring a motion to compel.  Fam. Code section 2107.

            Fam. Code section 2104 sets forth the requirements for serving a preliminary declaration of disclosure (“PDD”).  Subdivision (a) requires each party to serve the other with a preliminary declaration of disclosure, unless excused by court order for good cause, or when service is not required pursuant to Section 2110.  Fam. Code section 2014(b) states that each party must file with the court proof of service of the preliminary declaration of disclosure.  Fam. Code section 2104 requires the service to take place within the time period set forth in subdivision (f).  Subdivision (f) requires petitioner to serve the PDD either concurrently with the petition or within 60 days of filing the petition. Respondent must serve the PDD either with the response or within 60 days of filing the response.

            The PDD must include all tax returns filed by the declarant within the two years prior to the date that the party served the declaration along with sufficient information to show the identity of all assets in which the party may have an interest, all liabilities for which the party may be liable, and the party’s percentage of each asset and percentage of obligation for each liability.  Fam. Code section 2104.  As set forth on the PDD form FL-140, the PDD must include as attachments: a completed schedule of Assets and Debts form FL-142 or form FL-160 Property Declaration; completed Income and Expense Declaration (“IED”) on form FL-150; the required tax returns for the two prior years; statements of material facts regarding assets and debt obligations; and an accurate and complete written disclosure of investment, business, or other opportunity.

            Fam. Code section 2107 governs the failure to comply with the requirements for preliminary declarations of disclosure set forth in section 2104.  It states that where one party has complied and the other has not, the complying party may, within a reasonable time, ask the other to prepare the PDD.  It also states that, if the other party still fails to comply, the complying party may file a motion either 1) to compel compliance, or 2) for an order preventing the noncomplying party from presenting evidence on issues that should have been covered in the declaration of disclosure.  According to subdivision (c), in addition to other remedies where a party fails to comply with disclosure requirements, the court “shall… impose money sanctions against the noncomplying party. Sanctions shall be in an amount sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct, and shall include reasonable attorney’s fees, costs incurred, or both, unless the court finds that the noncomplying party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Discussion

Compelling Financial Documents

            Petitioner shows that she has complied with the requirements for serving her PDD, IED, Schedule, and related documents, and that she requested Respondent to provide his.  Respondent does not dispute those facts.

            The dispute here is about the sufficiency of the documents which Respondent served.  Petitioner claims that they were incomplete, lack required attached financial documents, and contain inaccuracies, but she fails to provide sufficient information or notice for compelling new documents.  When Petitioner filed this RFO and motion, she sought only service of the documents on the ground that Respondent had not provided them at all.  He subsequently served the requested documents on July 10, 2026 and Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent in fact did provide those documents.  The court also notes that while Petitioner did not actually serve her financial documents within the time she was supposed to do so, Respondent actually served his before he was required to do so, since he did not file his response to the petition until July 31, 2026, after he had served his financial documents.  As stated above, he was not required to serve those documents until 60 days after filing his response.  The court also notes that Respondent served his financial documents only about 2 weeks after Petitioner filed this motion and Petitioner, while stating that she asked for the documents, fails to clarify when she asked for them.  Respondent, moreover, then served new financial documents.  Although now claiming that the financial documents are incomplete or inaccurate, Petitioner also fails to provide any information supporting or explaining this assertion, rendering it impossible for the court to determine if Respondent’s documents in fact are incomplete or inaccurate.  Finally, the fact that Respondent served these new financial documents after Petitioner served her supplemental declaration claiming that the prior ones were incomplete means that the analysis of the documents’ sufficiency now must be based on the new financial documents and the court has absolutely no information regarding those.  Were Petitioner to raise defects on those documents now, the court would not have sufficient information or time to consider the issues while Respondent would not have received sufficient notice of Petitioner’s new arguments.  Accordingly, should Petitioner find that the new documents are in fact defective, she must file a new RFO and motion regarding them, demonstrating with evidence and explanation how they are defective. 

            The court DENIES the motion as to compelling the financial documents, without prejudice to Petitioner bring a motion based on alleged defects regarding the documents.  

Attorney’s Fees and Costs

            Petitioner seeks an order that Respondent provide funds for her attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fam. Code section 2030.  This provision states that the court must ensure that each party has access to legal representation by ordering, if necessary, one party to pay the other party or attorney reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for maintaining or defending the proceedings.  The court must make findings as to whether the award is appropriate, there is a disparity in access to funds, and whether one party is able to pay for the legal representation of both.  It allows recovery of such litigation expenses in the family-law action and any other “related” action.

            Preliminarily, the necessary, fundamental basis for this motion is that the moving party must demonstrate a disparity in financial ability to pay for litigation and that the moving party lacks sufficient resources to pay for litigation.  Subdivision (a)(2) states, in pertinent part and with emphasis added,

the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney's fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both…. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney's fees and costs.

            At this point, Petitioner demonstrates no basis for such an award.  She, like Respondent, has been self-represented throughout this litigation up to this point.  Although she may ultimately demonstrate a need for such an award and may hire an attorney, at this point she has not done so.  Moreover, Petitioner fails to provide sufficient evidence and explanation to demonstrate the need and financial disparity between the parties. 

            Absent more information, the court DENIES the motion on this point, without prejudice.  Petitioner therefore may again request such an order in the event that circumstances later warrant it. 

Other Issues

            On all other issues, the court lacks meaningful information at this point and accordingly REQUIRES APPEARANCES of the parties at the hearing.

Conclusion

            Respondent shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

            It is SO ORDERED.

 
 

2.         24FL00492, Rail/Rail Disso

TENTATIVE RULING:

            Respondent’s Motion to Enforce 8/4/25 Judgment GRANTED as to the necklace, but DENIED on other issues.  The request for attorney’s fees and costs is denied. 

            Petitioner’s Motion for Compliance Orders per F.C. 290 for Division of IRAs and Breach of Duty (F.C.721) DENIED.  The request for attorney’s fees and costs is denied. 

Facts

            Petitioner (“Melissa” or “Petitioner”) filed this action for dissolution of marriage without minor children on March 11, 2024.  Respondent (“Erich” or “Respondent”) filed his response on March 31, 2024.  The parties reached an agreement for uncontested judgment of status in December 2024, and the court entered a status-only judgment of dissolution on December 24, 2024.  The parties then, in July and August 2025, reached an agreement for uncontested judgment on remaining issues, filed a stipulation for mutual waiver of final declarations of disclosure, and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”).  The court entered judgment (the “Judgment”) on the reserved issues pursuant to, and incorporating, the attached MSA, on August 4, 2025.  Essentially no litigation occurred in this case following the entry of the Judgment until June 2026, when Respondent filed a motion seeking enforcement of the Judgment.  Petitioner filed her own motion to enforce terms of the Judgment and ultimately both motions were continued to November 13, 2026.

Motions

            This matter is on calendar for two motions, one by each party, regarding enforcement of the Judgment.

            In his Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Enforce 8/4/25 Judgment, Respondent Erich moves the court to order Melissa to comply with certain terms of the Judgment, specifically to give him his grandmother’s necklace (the “Necklace”) and pay her share of the joint tax liability for 2024 (the “Tax Liability”).  He also seeks sanctions for the legal expenses related to this motion pursuant to Family Code section 271. 

            Melissa opposes this motion.  She contends that she has never violated the Judgment because she does not have the Necklace or know where it is and she has paid Erich her share of the Tax Liability as agreed on in the MSA.  She contends that Erich is seeking to have her pay additional taxes beyond those to which the parties agreed, specifically some of Erich’s own personal tax liability for 2024, whereas the Tax Liability which the Judgment requires her to share is limited to the parties’ joint partnership, Eide Bailley Partnership (the “Partnership”) and 2024 Social Security liability.  Like Erich in his motion, Melissa seeks attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fam.Code section 271.  

            Erich has filed a reply, reasserting his position.

            In her RFO and Motion for Compliance Orders per F.C. 290 for Division of IRAs and Breach of Duty (F.C.721), which is effectively also for enforcement of the Judgment, Melissa moves the court to order Erich to comply with other provisions of the Judgment.  She asks to the court to order Erich to turn over her share of the Partnership income pursuant to the Judgment and execute all documents necessary to divide several accounts per the Judgment (collectively, the “Accounts”): Erich’s Vanguard IRA account (the “Vanguard Account”), her Fidelity Account (the “Fidelity Account”), and her American Fund Account (the “American Account”).  She also seeks an order that Erich reimburse her for taxes erroneously withheld for 2025, and limit tax withholding on the Partnership.  Finally, she asks the court to order Erich to pay the attorney’s fees and costs for enforcement.

            Erich opposes this motion.  He contends that he provided his documents needed to divide the Accounts and requested statements from Melissa regarding the Accounts for the purpose of division, but Melissa failed to do so until June 2026, after he had filed a motion on the issue.  He adds that Melissa’s attorney recently informed him that Melissa had, unbeknownst to him, withdrawn funds from one of her accounts in the early stages of the litigation, raising concerns about the funds in them.  He claims that he then proceeded with the division of all three accounts so that the Vanguard and Fidelity accounts are now fully divided while he us awaiting information for the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) regarding the American Account. 

            Melissa has also filed a reply, reasserting her position. 

Applicable Authority

          According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

          If a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) was “merged” or “incorporated” into the judgment, it no longer operates as an independent legal instrument so enforcement remedies instead are based exclusively on the judgment.  See Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App. 3d 647, 656.  It is well established, therefore, that an MSA incorporated into a judgment provides the terms of that judgment and is thus enforceable as a judgment.  Courts construe the terms of an MSA with the goal of giving effect to the mutual intent of the parties so that the terms of the MSA control, as long as they are clear and unambiguous.  Hibberd, supra, 1013. 

          Fam. Code section 290 expressly authorizes the court to enforce judgments or orders by methods which the court, in its discretion finds to be necessary.  It states, in full, “A judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code may be enforced by the court by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary.”

            The rules regarding the period of enforceability and renewal of judgments in the Enforcement of Judgments Law (“EJL”) at CCP section 683.010 et seq. do not limit the court’s discretion when enforcing Family Code judgments and orders.  Fam.Code section 291.  Accordingly, a money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property or support made or entered under the Family Code, is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied.  Fam.Code section 291(a); Schelb v. Stein (2010) 190 Cal.App. 4th 1440, 1447. 

          Courts have authority to enforce a judgment, including one which incorporates an MSA.  CCP section 128 gives the court the power to control the proceedings before it, preserve and enforce order, compel obedience to judgments, orders, etc.; and make orders and process “conform to law and justice.”  The court in Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Ass'n v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, at 679, explained,

The inherent power of the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued is well established [Citations]; the court may make discretionary orders with reasonable conditions; and even make subsequent limitations and modifications of prior orders in order to achieve justice [Citation]….” 

          Courts therefore have inherent power to control judicial proceedings in order to ensure orderly administration of justice and to see to it that all persons indulge in no act or conduct calculated to obstruct administration of justice.  People v. Smith (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 897.

            Accordingly, as explained in In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, at 1439-1440, courts may enforce the terms of MSAs incorporated into judgments when enforcing those judgments, and “[m]arital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.”

            Spouses have fiduciary obligations to each other which remain following separation until a final distribution of assets.  Fam. Code section2 721, 1101; Marriage of Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App. 4th 1252, 1270 (the fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until the final distribution of assets).  As Fam. Code section 721 states, “spouses are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.”  The obligations expressly include, among others, providing each spouse access at all times to any books regarding transactions, providing true and full information of all things affecting any transaction that concerns the community property, and accounting to the spouse. 

Discussion: Erich’s Motion

Necklace

            The first issue presented in Erich’s motion is the return of the Necklace.  Erich correctly asserts that the Judgment expressly states that he is entitled to the Necklace specifically, along with another item not in his possession, both in addition to items already in his possession.  Judgment, MSA section 2.2(m).  It adds that he was entitled to this item, in addition to those items in his possession, demonstrating that it was not in his possession and Melissa, by agreeing to the MSA, expressly agreed to that.  He asserts that if Melissa cannot locate the Necklace to return to him she must pay him its fair market value, arguing that this is one item of property bargained for.  He demonstrates that he, and later his attorney, repeatedly asked Melissa to return it in accordance with the Judgment.  He also shows that Melissa has not done so, claiming that she does not have it and that it was lost in the Tubbs Fire of 2017. 

            Melissa responds that she does not have the Necklace and does not know where it is.  She expressly states this under oath.  She also asserts that Erich has never explained why he believes that she ever had the Necklace and she argues that the MSA assumes that it was in his possession.

            Erich’s position here is persuasive and Melissa’s argument is not persuasive.  Contrary to Melissa’s claim, MSA 2.2(m) expressly assumes that the Necklace was not in Erich’s possession, and therefore was in Melissa’s.  It states that Erich is entitled to “All… personal property… in ERICH’s possession, as well as the Peloton… and… necklace.”  Emphasis added.  Erich explains that Melissa had the Peloton in her possession and subsequently delivered it to him.  The language puts the Necklace in the same position and therefore not only entitles Erich to the Necklace specifically but also expressly indicates that it was not in his possession but instead in Melissa’s.  The reasonable interpretation is that Melissa accordingly had it and, like the Peloton, would return it to him.  Melissa’s argument that she never had it at that time is unpersuasive because the parties clearly bargained for this language.  The most reasonable interpretation of this provision is therefore that the parties agreed that Erich would be entitled to the Necklace and that it was not in his possession, imposing an obligation on Melissa to provide it.  If Melissa did not have the Necklace, she would not logically have agreed to such language in the MSA.  On its face, this language also therefore imposes the burden of not finding the Necklace on Melissa, not Erich.  In light of Melissa’s statement that she cannot locate it or does not have it, Erich is correct that, since the parties bargained for it as part of the value of the property divided, Melissa should instead provide the fair market value.  

            The Court GRANTS the motion as to the Necklace.  Melissa must provide to Erich either the Necklace or, in lieu of it, the fair market value of the Necklace. 

Tax Liability

            Erich also moves the court to order establishing the parties’ joint 2024 Tax Liability or requiring Melissa to pay her share, a remaining alleged balance of $3,061.  Melissa acknowledges that the MSA requires her to pay half of the 2024 tax liability for the Partnership and Erich’s social security income but claims that the amount Erich states improperly includes some of his own personal tax liability for 2024.

            The MSA at section 8.3 expressly requires the parties to share equally the 2024 Tax Liability for the Partnership and Erich’s social security income.  It states, in pertinent part and with emphasis added,

The parties agree to file separate income tax returns in 2024 and for all

future years. For 2024 specifically, the parties shall equally share the

Federal and State tax liability for the 2024 Eide Bailley income and Erich’s

social security income. 

            The dispute is the amount.  Erich claims that the total of the Tax Liability is $35,332 so that Melissa owes a total of $17,666, requiring her to pay another $3,061 beyond the amount withheld for her tax payment.  Melissa claims that the amount she owes is $14,606, the amount withheld already, so she owes nothing more.             

            As Erich notes, section 8.3 does not state how the tax liability is to be calculated but it is set forth in the context of the prior statements of how to calculate the tax liability for other years.  For 2025 through 2028, MSA section 8.1 also states that each party is responsible for half of the Partnership tax liability for that period.   However, it adds that for “2025 through 2028” expressly, Erich will claim the full Partnership payments on his returns and apply the 30% withheld on income which he claims on his individual taxes and, if this results in an overpayment or underpayment, each party shall receive or bear 50% of the difference.  Erich also refers to MSA section 8.2, which gives specific terms regarding the 2023 taxes, expressly so that it “resolves ERICH’s request for reimbursement” for Melissa’s half of the 2023 tax liability.

            The dispute appears, as far as the court can discern, to rest on the methodology and terms for determining the tax liability.  Erich expressly makes clear that he based in the 2024 calculations on the methodologies and terms set forth in section 8.1 for the 2025-2028 taxes and section 8.2 for the 2023 taxes.  Melissa claims that Erich has improperly applied these methodologies to the 2024 taxes and that, not applying them, she owes only the amount already withheld pursuant to the tax calculations for one half of the liability for the Partnership liability and Erich’s social security income, without the modifications resulting from the terms in sections 8.1 and 8.2.  The difference in the dollar amount which the parties have reached appears to the court to be based in these different approaches. 

            Melissa is persuasive on this point, although at the court, at this time, lacks enough information to be able to determine the ultimate, specific dollar amount of the tax liability.  Erich’s reliance on the methodologies and terms in sections 8.1 and 8.3 is incorrect and his explanation unpersuasive.  The MSA terms are expressly clear that the methods for determining the ultimate tax liability in sections 8.1 and 8.2 are specifically limited to those years and do not apply to other years, including 2024.

            The Court DENIES Erich’s motion on this point. 

Discussion: Melissa’s Motion

Payment of Partnership Income

            Melissa asks  the court to order Erich to turn over her full share of the Partnership monthly income pursuant to the Judgment.  She claims that Erich failed to give her the monthly payments of $3,325 for September-December 2025, a total of $13,300. 

            Erich admits that he is to pay Melissa her share of monthly Partnership income but responds that he only withheld part of her income to apply it towards her share of the 2024 Tax Liability.  He adds that he only withheld the portion needed to cover her undisputed portion of the Tax Liability and nothing more.  He contends that Melissa never objected to this until January 2026, since then he has ceased withholding any of her payments for taxes, and Melissa never asked him to hand over the funds to her.  Melissa in her motion notes that Erich made this assertion but claims that she is owed the money nonetheless and Erich must address the payment of the Tax Liability separately. 

            This issue is not entirely clear to the court and both sides appear to have some valid and some invalid points but overall Melissa’s motion is just not persuasive on this issue.  There is no dispute that Erich must pay Melissa her monthly Partnership income but there is also no dispute that Melissa owes taxes for the Partnership and specifically at least $14,606 for 2024, while the amount at issue here is less than that amount.  There is no indication that Erich withheld the funds for anything other than paying Melissa’s share of tax liability and Melissa provides neither evidence nor any claims that Erich withheld the money for any other purpose.  Erich’s stated  purpose is logical and reasonable, with no indication of impropriety, breach of fiduciary duty, or wrongful purpose.  AT the same time, the manner in which Erich unilaterally decided to address Melissa’s tax payments by simply withholding a portion of her income, appears to have been an improper approach.  Nothing in the MSA or any papers which either party presents indicates that Erich was authorized to handle the liability payments in this manner or in a different manner.  Melissa’s claim that Erich should therefore give Melissa her share of the payments and then seek payment from Melissa for her tax liability is therefore reasonable, albeit arguably a more cumbersome and potentially less reliable method.  Finally, the issue has now apparently been resolved for all future tax payments, since Erich has stopped withholding funds in this manner for taxes.  As for the funds already withheld for payment of Melissa’s share of taxes, that was not a breach of fiduciary duty or clearly improper.  Since Melissa had to pay that money, anyway, the court finds no basis to force Erich to give those funds now, if indeed they are, or have been, used to pay Melissa’s tax liability. 

            The Court DENIES the motion on this point.  It finds that Erich must pay Melissa her share of the Partnership income and that the parties must separately resolve Melissa’s payment of tax liability.  As noted, Erich states that he is already taking that approach.   

Account Division

            Melissa next seeks an order compelling Erich to execute all documents necessary to divide the Accounts per the Judgment.  Erich contends that he was waiting for all documents and, since obtaining them, has proceeded with the division of all three accounts so that the Vanguard and Fidelity accounts are now fully divided while he is awaiting further information for the QDRO regarding the American Account.  At this time, there appears to be no further basis for Melissa’s motion on this point.

Taxes

            The final issue in Melissa’s motion is essentially the same as her opposition to Erich’s motion regarding the Tax Liability.  The court has addressed this above.  There is nothing to grant on this point at this time since the issue is not a violation of the Judgment by Erich but a dispute about Erich’s claim that Melissa violated the Judgment on this issue.  As explained above in the discussion of Erich’s motion, Erich is not persuasive on this point but the dispute appears to be in good faith. 

            The court finds the motion to be MOOT on this point in light of the ruling on Erich’s motion addressing this issue.

Sanctions

            Both parties seek monetary sanctions for the legal expenses related to these motions, pursuant to Fam. Code section 271. Fam. Code section 271 broadly authorizes the court to make an award of attorney’s fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” and “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this code,” based on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.”  The party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs on this basis is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

            The Court finds that both sides have, overall, acted somewhat reasonably, but somewhat understandably, both sides are partly, but not wholly correct, and that no evidence indicates that either side has acted in bad faith.  The Court DENIES both parties’ requests for sanctions for attorney’s fees and costs.

Conclusion

            As explained above, the Court GRANTS Erich’s motion with respect to the Necklace but DENIES it on the issue of the Tax Liability, while the Court DENIES Melissa’s motion in full, and DENIES all requests for attorney’s fees and costs. 

            Erich’s attorney shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.          

            It is SO ORDERED

**This is the end of the Tentative Rulings.***