Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 23

Law & Motion Calendar

The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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Law & Motion Tentative Rulings

October 1, 2026
9:30AM & 1:30PM

1. 25FL02224, Moretti/Casarotti-Moretti Dissolution

This matter has been referred to the assigned Discovery Referee, Hon. Verna Adams, per the Order issued and served 09/21/2026. Therefore, the matter is dropped from calendar.

2. 26FL00070, Montes/Montes Chaparro Dissolution

Motion to Set Aside Default and Permit Filing of his Response GRANTED. The proposed response with Respondent has attached to his motion is deemed to be the response and deemed filed at the time this ruling becomes final. Respondent must, however, provide a final copy to the court for filing. The copy must be identical to the one attached to the motion and he must submit a copy to Petitioner, along with the proposed order, allowing Petitioner to object to its form in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

Facts

Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage without minor children on January 14, 2026. She filed a proof of service on May 19, 2026, showing that someone who appears to be named Martha Aguirre (“Aguirre”) personally served Respondent with the summons, petition, and related documents on April 14, 2026 at 596 Roseland Ave, Santa Rosa, CA 95407. Petitioner also obtained entry of default against Respondent on May 19, 2026.

Motion

In his Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside Default and Permit Filing of his Response, Respondent moves the court to set aside the default. He claims that he was not properly or knowingly served with the petition and summons. He asserts that the location of the alleged service was the parties’ residence and that at the date and time of the alleged service he and Petitioner were arguing, at which time Petitioner threw at him a packet containing the court documents. He asserts that no other person, and no non-party over the age of 18, ever served him. He explains that after Petitioner took his default, he examined the proof of service and found that it states that Aguirre served him, but that Aguirre is Petitioner’s mother and he has not seen her since about December 2025. He adds that neither Aguirre nor anyone else, other than Petitioner during the argument, has ever given him the summons and petition. Respondent provides a copy of his proposed response.

Petitioner opposes the motion. She argues that Aguirre personally accompanied her to the residence for the purpose of serving Respondent but as she approached him in order to serve him with the documents, he and Petitioner began to argue.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided. This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

Relief from support orders, due to default or otherwise, in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691. In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911; see also CRC 5.2(d) (provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided).

CCP section 473(b) allows parties to set aside dismissals or defaults, or the functional equivalent thereof, based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. CCP § 473(b). “[D]iscretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.” English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 149; see also Las Vegas Land & Development Co., LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1086, at 1092-1093 (quoting and relying on English).

The motion “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed… otherwise the application shall not be granted….” CCP section 473(b).

An order setting aside the default is discretionary whereas based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. CCP § 473(b).

There is also a policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits and the motion to vacate should be granted if the moving party shows a credible, excusable explanation. Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227. The provision of this section authorizing court to relieve party from a judgment or order resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is remedial in its nature and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases on their merits. Ramsey Trucking Co. v. Mitchell (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d Supp. 862.

“Surprise” is “some condition or situation in which a party... is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Calif. v. National Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173.

“Excusable neglect” comes down to whether the moving party has shown a reasonable excuse for the default. Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905. The moving party must show that the default would not have been avoided through ordinary care. Elms v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513. The test ultimately is thus one of reasonable diligence. Jackson v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 55, 58. A showing that the defendant was unable to understand what he was served with is sufficient to justify relief. Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208. Another valid basis is if the defendant mislaid or misfiled the papers and as a result failed to obtain an attorney in time. Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683-686. Simply forgetting about the lawsuit or being too “busy” is not adequate. Andrews v. Jacoby (1919) 39 Cal.App. 382, 383-384. Excusable neglect by attorneys includes situations where, despite reasonable supervision, an attorney’s secretary misfiled papers or failed to enter an appearance date. Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 234; Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273.

A judgment may be set aside where void pursuant to CCP section 473(d). Such an order may apply where there is no valid service. Lovato v. Santa Fe Int’l Corp. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 549, 553 (void for lack of notice where discovery requests served only on defendant’s attorney, who had been suspended by state bar and lacked authority to represent party); Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 313 (lack of proper service renders judgment void). Where the judgment is void, the moving party need not show a meritorious defense. CCP section 473(d); Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 86-87.

However, where the motion is based on lack of, or improper, service, where there has been actual notice, substantial compliance with the service requirements will defeat a motion to vacate. Gibble, supra. Service may be proper where a party tries to avoid service and the process server identifies himself or herself, states that the party is being served, and leaves the papers as close as possible to the party. Trujillo v Trujillo (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 257, 260.

A motion for relief from a judgment valid on its face but void for improper service must be brought within the earlier of 2 years from entry of default judgment, or 180 days after the party receives written notice, in accordance with the deadline set forth in CCP section 473.5 for motions based on lack of actual notice. Rogers v. Silverman (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1121-1122 (process server served the wrong person, but service facially valid, so 2 years deadline); see also Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 300, n.3.

CCP section 414.10 states that “Any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action” may serve a summons. Failure to comply with this requirement, as where a party serves the summons and complaint, renders the service ineffective. Braugh v. Dow (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 76, 88-90. The court in Braugh ruled that a default judgment was void and properly set aside where service had been made by a party to action, violating CCP section 414.10’s express requirements.

In addition to relief based on CCP section 473, a court may set aside a judgment adjudicating support or the division of property in accord with Family code section 2120, et seq., and 3691. Family Code sections 2120, 2121; see also In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (Fam. Code section 2122 governs relief from judgment while Fam. Code section 3691 governs relief from support orders other than judgment); see also In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620. Fam. Code section 3690 provides the basis for relief under section 3691 after the expiration of the deadline in CCP section 473.

Discussion

As noted above, Petitioner gave Respondent the summons, petition, and related documents on April 14, 2026. Petitioner obtained entry of default against Respondent on May 19, 2026. Respondent filed this motion on June 1, 2026.

Respondent’s motion is persuasive. Respondent asserts that Petitioner herself threw the summons, petition, and other papers at him at their residence during an argument. He adds that he never saw the alleged server, Aguirre, at that time. Respondent herself largely admits the basic facts which Respondent presents, acknowledging that she in fact was the one who gave Respondent the documents. She also agrees that she did so in the middle of a heated argument. She claims that Aguirre went with her in order to serve the documents but that as the argument arose, she grabbed the documents from Aguirre and “handed” them to Respondent. Even assuming Petitioner’s basic contention that Aguirre came with her to serve Respondent, Petitioner’s own evidence on its face shows no completed effort at valid service and shows invalid service. Petitioner does not even claim that Aguirre attempted to serve Respondent or that Respondent refused service, or the like. She only states that when Aguirre approached Respondent, she and Respondent began arguing so that even before Aguirre actually attempted service, she grabbed the documents from Aguirre in the heat of an argument and gave them to Respondent. Nothing about Petitioner’s own statements indicates a valid attempted service or that Respondent tried to avoid service or that Respondent even knew what the documents were at the time. Moreover, given the overall consistency with Respondent’s version of the events and the fact that there is not dispute that it happened in an argument, the court finds the differences which Petitioner claims to lack credibility. Her claim that she “handed” the documents to Respondent is far less credible than Respondent’s claim that she threw them at him, given that it occurred in the middle of an argument. This is particularly true since, even assuming Aguirre was actually there, Petitioner admits that the argument was heated enough for her to grab the documents from Aguirre before giving them to Petitioner. Finally, the speed with which Respondent filed this motion following the default shows that he was acting diligently. This in of itself is not a factor on a motion based on void service but it does provide further credibility to Respondent’s argument since it shows that he has not been trying to avoid the litigation and has attempted to act diligently. Such a finding tends to be inconsistent with a view that Respondent was trying to evade service or the like.

Given that the service appears unequivocally to be void due to lack of proper service, no substantial compliance, and no apparent effort by Respondent to evade service, the court must GRANT the motion.

Conclusion

The court GRANTS the motion. The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

It is SO ORDERED.

3. 26FL00572, Magda Dissolution

Motion to Set Aside Request Entered for Default Judgment CONTINUED to the law and motion calendar of February 5, 2027, in Department 23 at 9:30 a.m. in order to allow the parties to provide further briefing and explanation. Respondent must specify the legal basis for the requested relief and provide facts demonstrating the grounds in accordance with the authority set forth above. Respondent must also provide a proposed response to the petition. Respondent must file and serve further papers in support of the motion at least 16 court (work) days prior to the hearing. Petitioner must file and serve any new opposition at least 9 court days prior to the hearing. Respondent must file and serve any reply at least 5 court days prior to the hearing. The parties must also file proof of service showing that they have served the documents which they file.

Facts

Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with one minor child (the “Child”) on March 30, 2026, along with her Declaration Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). She filed a proof of service on April 3, 2026 showing that on April 1, 2026, she had Respondent personally served with the summons, petitioner, and UCCJEA Declaration.

Motion

In his Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside Request Entered for Default Judgment, Respondent moves the court to set aside the default on the grounds that the parties are still negotiating the issues, and he attempted to participate in the proceedings with respect to an ex parte application.

Petitioner opposes the motion, asserting that Respondent was properly served and noting that Respondent does not claim that service was defective or that he did not receive actual notice in time to respond.

Applicable Authority

The motion “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed… otherwise the application shall not be granted….” CCP section 473(b).

An order setting aside the default is discretionary where based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. CCP § 473(b).

Service and Notice

There is no proof of service showing service of the filed motion or notice of the hearing date. However, Petitioner has filed opposition on the merits, curing that defect. Petitioner herself, though, has not provided proof of service for her opposition so the court must disregard it unless that defect is cured.

The court notes that parties must not only serve their moving, opposition, and reply papers, but must file with the court a proof of service for the papers which they file, showing that they served the papers. California Rule of Court (“CRC”) 3.1300. Proof of service for a motion must be filed at least 5 court days prior to the hearing. Ibid.

Discussion

Respondent moves the court to set aside the “default judgment.” By this, he apparently means the default, since no judgment has yet been entered.

Respondent provides no memorandum of points and authorities, fails to set forth the legal basis for the motion, or the standards, and he does not clearly address any possible grounds to setting aside the default. He provides only a short declaration explaining that he has been trying to negotiate with Petitioner, he signed unspecified “divorce documents,” and he “complied with” a restraining order.

Petitioner’s evidence is also slim and vague, providing unclear and minimal information which does not support any basis for relief under the applicable law, although it does hint at some possibilities. For example, his statements imply a possible basis for mistake or fraud if he reasonably believed that Respondent had no intention of taking his default as long as the parties were negotiating, or that he reasonably believed that he had in fact appeared in the proceedings. His reference to taking part in litigation and complying with a restraining order appears to be for a separate Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) proceeding, 26FL00456 (the “DV Action”), which Petitioner briefly discusses in her opposition. That, however, is not part of this proceeding and any appearance in that DV Action does not qualify as an appearance in this action. The court does recognize, however, a possibility that Respondent may reasonably have been confused about the different nature of the separate proceedings.

The court notes that the motion provides some basis for believing there to be a potential basis for relief, but the court cannot grant the motion based on the information provided. Respondent must at the very least provide a clearer and more fill explanation which demonstrates one of the grounds for relief in the governing law.

Otherwise, Petitioner correctly argues that there is no apparent basis for setting aside the default due to lack of notice or improper service. She points out that the record includes a proof of service showing facially valid service of the summons, petition, and related papers, while Respondent does not state in any way that he lacked notice or did not receive proper service.

Petitioner also correctly notes that Respondent has failed to provide a propose response to the petition. This is mandatory.

Under the circumstances, given the policy in favor of allowing parties their day in court and the potential that there could be a valid basis for the requested relief, the court finds it appropriate to CONTINUE the motion to allow the parties to provide further briefing and explanation. Respondent must specify the legal basis for the requested relief and provide facts demonstrating the grounds in accordance with the authority set forth above. Respondent must also provide a proposed response to the petition. Respondent must file and serve further papers in support of the motion at least 16 court (work) days prior to the hearing. Petitioner must file and serve any new opposition at least 9 court days prior to the hearing. Respondent must file and serve any reply at least 5 court days prior to the hearing.

Conclusion

The motion is CONTINUED.

It is SO ORDERED.

4. SFL73183, Hartley Dissolution

Motion for Reimbursement and Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement DENIED. However, the court finds that Petitioner is obligated to pay an amount equal to half of the fees for Empire Soccer during the relevant period. The parties must address whether Petitioner has paid any amount for soccer expenses in the period at issue and must demonstrate what the fees for Empire Soccer would have been for that period, in order for the court to make a determination is to whether Petitioner owes anything and, if so, the amount owed. If the court is unable to make this determination at the hearing, the court will continue the motion to allow limited briefing on that one issue and for further determination of that one issue. If the court does continue the motion for that purpose, it will not revisit the other issues addressed in the motion and will not consider any additional requests for sanctions of any sort.

The court AWARDS to Petitioner, against Respondent, sanctions of $2,262.50, plus any additional amount of actual, reasonable expenses according to proof.

Facts

Petitioner Marcus Hartley (“Petitioner” or “Marcus”) filed this action for dissolution of marriage with two minor children (the “Children”) on March 28, 2016. The parties entered into a Martial Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) on September 14, 2016, and the court entered judgment (the “Judgment”) on December 5, 2016, based on and incorporating, the MSA, which is attached to the Judgment.

The parties continued to litigate over issues of child support and legal expenses through 2022. From late 2022 until April 2026, no litigation occurred and no party filed any papers.

The Children are no longer minors. The oldest (“Peyton”) turned 18 in 2024 and moved away to attend college while the youngest (“Lexi”) turned 18 on June 15, 2026. However, disputes regarding the care and expenses for Lexi arose continued through early 2026.

Motion

In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion for Reimbursement and Enforcement of Marital Settlement Agreement, Respondent Lisa Hartley (“Respondent” or “Lisa”) moves the court for clarification and enforcement of certain terms of the MSA regarding reimbursement of extracurricular expenses; modification of the tax dependency provisions in the MSA; and an award of $3,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.

Petitioner opposes the motion. He argues that he did not agree to the soccer expenses at issue, which go beyond those established at the time of the MSA, Respondent improperly seeks reimbursement for expenses going back several years despite the MSA’s requirement that reimbursements must be sought within 30 days, and Respondent improperly seeks to alter the tax exemptions to which the parties agreed and set forth in the MSA. He also seeks monetary sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271.

Applicable Authority

Where an MSA has been “merged” or “incorporated” into a judgment, it no longer operates as an independent legal instrument, so enforcement remedies are based exclusively on the judgment. See Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App. 3d 647, 656.

CCP §128 gives the court the power to control the proceedings before it, preserve and enforce order, compel obedience to judgments, orders, etc.; and make orders and process “conform to law and justice.” The court in Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Ass'n v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, at 679, explained,

The inherent power of the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued is well established [Citations]; the court may make discretionary orders with reasonable conditions; and even make subsequent limitations and modifications of prior orders in order to achieve justice [Citation]….”

Courts therefore have inherent power to control judicial proceedings in order to insure orderly administration of justice and to see to it that all persons indulge in no act or conduct calculated to obstruct administration of justice. People v. Smith (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 897.

The court generally may not simply alter the terms of a stipulated judgment, as when entering judgment upon a stipulation pursuant to CCP section 664.6. Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 267; Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374-1375. As the court explained in Leeman,

While the court may interpret the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, “nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.” [Citations.]

…

While the court has the authority to refuse to issue the requested consent judgment, what the court could not do in considering approval of a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 was to add to or modify an express term of the settlement.

The court in Ironbridge added, however, that courts have authority to fashion orders to enforce compliance with a stipulated judgment, stating,

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 allows the court to enter a stipulated judgment in settlement of a case, and to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Moreover, section 128, subdivision (a)(4) provides that the court has the power to “compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending therein.” These provisions, together, give the court authority to fashion orders to enforce compliance with a stipulated judgment.

Service and Opposition

There is no proof of service showing service of the filed motion or notice of the hearing date. However, Petitioner has opposed the motion on the merits without objecting to lack of notice.

Petitioner’s opposition itself is untimely, however. It was filed only 5 court days before the hearing. In light of the lack of proof of service on Petitioner, the court will disregard the lateness of the opposition. Should Respondent object, however, and show that she had insufficient notice to address the opposition, the court will continue the motion to allow Respondent opportunity to file a reply to the opposition.

Discussion

Enforcement of Expenses for Extracurricular Activities

Preliminarily, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to consider the substance of this motion. The court has authority to enforce the terms of a judgment, including terms of an incorporated MSA, as set forth above. The MSA itself also expressly reserves the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the MSA.

Respondent moves the court for clarification and enforcement of certain terms of the MSA regarding reimbursement of extracurricular expenses. She asserts that the MSA, at¶39, requires the parties to share extracurricular expenses equally. She is at least partly correct on that point. The MSA ¶39 states, in full,

EXTRACURRICULAR EXPENSES. Each parent will pay one-half of agreed upon extracurricular activities for the children as set forth herein. The children are not to be enrolled in more than one activity on Father’s time unless agreed upon by the parents. Neither parent is to schedule activities during the other’s parenting time without agreement, except for soccer and one activity on Father’s time. Father is not to pay for more than one activity at a time except soccer or upon further agreement of the parties.

Respondent claims that Petitioner has failed to pay his share of the expenses for Lexi’s soccer participation. She details the specific soccer expenses at her “Attachment 7 and 9” ¶¶4-13, with specific itemization and at Ex.B she provides copies of various statements showing payments which she states are for the various soccer expenses. These expenses go back to 2023 and are for participation in United I soccer, including costly travel throughout California and to several other states. Respondent demonstrates that Petitioner has failed to pay half of these expenses.

Petitioner acknowledges that the parties agreed to splitting the soccer expenses but argues that the soccer expenses at issue go beyond those established at the time of the MSA and that the parties did not agree to these extra expenses. He shows that at the time the parties entered into the MSA, Lexi was enrolled in Empire Soccer, a far less expenses league which amounted to only a few hundred dollars a year and required only local travel. He explains that in 2023 Respondent wanted to switch Lexi to the far more expensive United league, requiring much more extensive and costly travel as well as much higher fees. This was about seven years after the parties had entered into the MSA. Petitioner states that he objected to the switch due to the cost, told Respondent that he could not afford the additional expense, and stated that he would only agree to keeping Lexi enrolled in the less expensive Empire Soccer. However, he asserts, Respondent unilaterally switched to United over his objections, and paid the expenses herself for three years before now seeking reimbursement after the Children have turned 18 and his child-support obligations have ended.

The MSA is not clear on this issue. It limits the parties’ equal cost obligation to those “agreed upon extracurricular activities.” Emphasis added. It is not, however, certain that this limitation applies to soccer since, as set forth above, the MSA expressly discusses soccer separately from other obligations for extracurricular activities. At the same time, the MSA does not expressly make the distinction between soccer and other activities with respect to “agreed upon” expenses and it is not clear from the MSA that either parent is obligated to pay half of any and all potential soccer-related expenses absent an agreement. The soccer expenses which Respondent discusses also include expenses above and beyond simply playing in a soccer league and include substantial expenses for tournaments far afield. Petitioner also shows that at the time of the MSA, the Children were enrolled in a less expensive league with far more limited travel costs. He also shows that about 7 years after the MSA, during which time the Children had remained in the less expensive league, Respondent unilaterally chose to switch Lexi to the far more expensive fees with greater travel costs and she did so over Petitioner’s express objection based on the costs and the understanding that Lexi would be in the less costly league. The record also demonstrates that it has been about 3 years since Respondent made the change and yet she is only now seeking reimbursement after all this time. The court also notes, as Petitioner points out, that now both Children are over 18 and Petitioner’s child-support obligations for Peyton have come to an end while the obligations for Lexi are almost at an end, according to the MSA terms.

The court interprets the MSA as anticipating shared expenses specifically for soccer but not the additional expenses for the more costly United league. The court therefore finds that the MSA requires each parent to pay half of all reasonable, typical soccer-related expenses for the Empire league as the parties had envisioned and understood at the time they entered into the MSA. The MSA also requires agreement for any additional activity expenses, Petitioner did not agree to these, and Respondent improperly waited for three years before seeking reimbursement after unilaterally switching to the more costly league even though she knew Petitioner objected due to the expense.

The end result is that Petitioner is obligated to pay for any expense equal to half of the fees which the parties would have incurred had Lexi remained in the less costly Empire Soccer, but he is not obligated to pay any more than that. The parties do not make it clear if Petitioner has paid anything during this time. The court therefore requires the parties to present evidence of what the fees for Empire Soccer would have been during the period in question, which Petitioner is obligated to pay. The parties must show whether Petitioner has made any of that amount. Petitioner is not, however, obligated to pay any soccer expenses beyond that base amount.

Unless the court is able to make a determination on the amount of expenses owed for the Empire Soccer league at the hearing, the court will continue the motion to allow resolution of this specific issue.

Modification of Tax Provisions

Respondent also asks the court to modify the MSA provisions regarding tax dependency on the ground that it “is no longer equitable” since Petitioner no longer provides support to Peyton aside from alternating health-insurance coverage. This, however, is outside the scope of a motion to enforce a judgment because it seeks fundamentally different relief, modifying a judgment instead of enforcing it.

Respondent also presents no legal basis for this relief. As noted above, courts may not simply alter the terms of a stipulated judgment, as is the case here. Although there are potential methods of seeking this form of relief, they are specific and limited, and Respondent discusses neither any potentially applicable law nor the analysis or grounds required for setting aside or modifying a judgment. For example, relief from judgments or court orders in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691. In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (Fam. Code section 2122 governs relief from judgment while Fam. Code section 3691 governs relief from support orders other than judgment); see also In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620. These provisions of the Family Code allow a party to seek relief based on fraud, perjury, and lack of notice.

Finally, Respondent presents no factual basis for the request. She simply says that she now finds the situation not to be equitable but she provides nothing showing any of the grounds set forth in the authority above. She complains only that Petitioner no longer provides any support for Peyton other than sharing the coverage for health insurance. This, however, does not support a finding of mistake, fraud, perjury, or the like. It also does not necessarily demonstrate that it is inequitable for him to continue claiming her as a dependent for tax purposes or address whether it may be necessary for him to do so in order to provide health insurance for her. Respondent could potentially have a basis for addressing this issue in the context of enforcing the judgment if she were to show that Petitioner is required to provide additional support in order to claim her as a dependent, but Respondent fails to do this. She provides no indication that Petitioner has violated the Judgment in this regard. She also admits that Respondent’s conduct here is in fact consistent with the MSA stating in her “Attachment 7 and 9” at ¶21,

The MSA provides at paragraph 43 that MARCUS claims LEXI and I claim PAYTON on our taxes each year, until PAYTON no longer qualifies as a dependent for either of us, and then we are supposed to alternate claiming LEXI as our dependent – MARCUS in odd numbered years and me in even-numbered years.

This is exactly what she says is occurring. The court DENIES the motion on this point.

Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Both parties request monetary sanctions for attorney’s fees and costs. The court can find no clear provision in the MSA regarding this issue and neither party points to any. However, Fam. Code section 271 appears to be applicable and Petitioner expressly bases his request on that provision.

Fam. Code section 271 broadly authorizes the court to make an award of attorney’s fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” and “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this code,” based on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” The party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs on this basis is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

Respondent also requests an award of $3,000 for attorney’s fees and costs. However, she is self-represented and accordingly has no attorney’s fees associated with this motion. She also presents no evidence or other basis for the requested award.

The court also finds the motion to be unpersuasive and unnecessary. The motion is entirely devoid of support regarding the request to modify the tax exemption provision. It is also unpersuasive as to the soccer expenses. Even if Petitioner is obligated to reimburse Respondent for an amount equivalent to his share of the less expensive Empire Soccer fees, this does not alter the court’s view that the motion it without support and unnecessary. Respondent would have avoided the problem by not unilaterally changing soccer leagues in the face of express disagreement, or if she had come to an agreement regarding the limited Empire Soccer fees and not waited three years before raising the issue with the court. As a result, Respondent is not entitled to recover any sanctions award but Petitioner is entitled to an award for his fees and costs.

Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs of $2,262.50 for his expenses incurred in opposing this motion, plus an anticipated amount of $1,500 for reviewing a reply and appearing at the hearing. He sets forth the supporting information in the declaration of his attorney, with attached billing records, showing the time spent at $375 for an attorney and $500 for another attorney. Petitioner also demonstrates that Respondent’s April 27, 2026 Income and Expense Declaration shows sufficient income and deposit balances to pay the amount requested.

The amount requested is reasonable, but the court will only award sanctions for the expenses both reasonably and actually incurred. At this point, that is $2,262.50. The court AWARDS to Petitioner, against Respondent, sanctions of $2,262.50, plus any additional amount of actual, reasonable expenses according to proof.

Conclusion

The motion is DENIED. However, the court finds that Petitioner is obligated to pay an amount equal to half of the fees for Empire Soccer during the relevant period. The parties must address whether Petitioner has paid any amount for soccer expenses in the period at issue, and must demonstrate what the fees for Empire Soccer would have been for that period, in order for the court to make a determination is to whether Petitioner owes anything and, if so, the amount owed.

The court AWARDS to Petitioner, against Respondent, sanctions of $2,262.50, plus any additional amount of actual, reasonable expenses according to proof.

Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

It is SO ORDERED.

5. SFL090525, Wong-Bigel/Bigel Dissolution

On the Court’s own motion, the matter is continued to further Law and Motion calendar on October 16, 2026 at 9:30am in department 23. No further briefing permitted.

6. SFL091513, Rodriguez/Kuprian-Costa Dissolution

The matter is continued to further Law and Motion calendar on February 25, 2027 at 9:30am in department 23. Moving party failed to provide or file a Memorandum of Law, Points and Authorities nor include the authorities relied upon in support of this motion in accordance with Local Rule 9.19C. Additionally, moving party failed to personally serve this motion as it is post-judgment.

**This is the end of the Tentative Rulings for the 9:30AM Calendar.***

THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING IS FOR A SPECIAL SET LAW AND MOTION MATTER AT 1:30PM IN THIS DEPARTMENT. PARTIES/COUNSEL ARE TO FOLLOW THE DIRECTION STATED ABOVE FOR REQUESTING HEARING.

1. SFL080301, Soloman Dissolution

Motion to Compel, Sanctions & Attorney Fees and Cost GRANTED in part, MOOT in part. The court GRANTS the motion as to the form interrogatories, requests for production, documents promised but not produced, and contention interrogatories 1-4, 6-8, 10, 15-18, 21-22, and 26-27. Respondent failed to provide new responses for those items. The motion is MOOT as to the remining contention interrogatories, for which Respondent provided new responses. The court also GRANTS the motion as to an award of sanctions. The court AWARDS to Petitioner, against Respondent, sanctions of $14,375, as explained herein.

Facts

Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor child (the “Child”) on June 29, 2018, raising issues of custody, visitation, spousal support, and both separate and community property interests. Petitioner on July 9, 2019, filed a completed stipulation for waiver of the final declaration of disclosure (“FDD”) and request to enter default based upon an agreement between the parties. The court entered the default that day. On September 5, 2019, Petitioner filed a declaration for uncontested dissolution based on a default with an agreement. He requested entry of judgment pursuant to the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) and the court entered judgment (the “Judgment”) with the MSA attached and incorporated into the Judgment. The court reserved jurisdiction over all other issues. On November 7, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation to correct scrivener’s error in the Judgment and enter an amended judgment. That same day, the court entered the Amended Judgment and served Notice of Entry of Judgment on the parties. The parties then filed a stipulation on January 7, 2020, to added and incorporate pages inadvertently left out of the Amended Judgment.

Litigation resumed in March 2022 with Petitioner’s Request for Order (“RFO”) to change child support in order to reduce it to zero based on changed circumstances. The parties litigated over the issue until August 2022, when the parties entered into a stipulation regarding child support (the “2022 Stipulation”). The court entered the 2022 Stipulation as an order and filed it on August 24, 2022. This 2022 Stipulation, among other things, reduced Petitioner’s monthly child support obligation from $2,500 to $2,000.

On August 29, 2024, Petitioner filed another RFO to modify and reduce child support to zero (the “2024 RFO”), based on the fact that he had retired due to medical reasons and was no longer earning income but instead was living off of his savings.

Respondent later filed an RFO and Motion to Set Aside August 24, 2022, Stipulation and Order, moving the court to set aside the 2022 Stipulation on the basis that she obtained discovery regarding the 2024 RFO which showed that Petitioner had not properly disclosed his income, his severance pay, or a yacht. For the hearing on May 1, 2026, the court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion and no party appeared or contested the ruling, which the court adopted as its order.

Discovery

As set forth in the Declaration of Brian Lanz filed on August 21, 2026, in preparation for the upcoming trial on modification of child support, Petitioner served Respondent with a Demand for Production of Documents and Things, Set One (“RFPs”), Form Interrogatories-Family Law, Set One, and Contention Interrogatories-Family Law, Set One (collectively, the “Discovery”). Respondent served responses on July 9, 2026, but the responses were unverified, with a statement that verification would follow. Respondent promised to provide some responsive documents but never completed the production as promised. Petitioner also considered some responses to be evasive and incomplete. As a result of these issues, Petitioner contacted Respondent in an effort to resolve the matter informally, identifying what he considered to be the deficiencies for specific items, explaining why, and asking for further responses. Respondent replied that she was willing to provide further responses and asked for an additional 7 days to do so but, although Petitioner waited the 7 days, Respondent never provided any further responses, verification, or documents. After that 7-day period had expired, on August 17, 2026, Petitioner contacted Respondent by e-mail explaining the situation, again seeking new responses, and warning that he would need to file the motion. Respondent, however, still provided no new responses, verification, or production.

Motion

In his RFO and Motion to Compel, Sanctions & Attorney Fees and Costs, Petitioner moves the court to compel Respondent to provide further responses with verification. He also seeks monetary sanctions of $6,000 plus $10,230 in attorney’s fees.

Respondent filed opposition. She argues that although Petitioner had warned of this motion, she was not aware of it until the ex parte application for advancing the hearing. She contends that she finally served new responses on September 9, 2026, with verifications, along with nearly 500 pages of documents. She claims that the motion was premature and unnecessary because she had planned to provide new responses and production but simply had not completed this prior to Petitioner filing the motion. She also argues that “the vast majority” of the interrogatories exceed the scope of discovery.

Petitioner has filed reply papers. He acknowledges that Respondent has now served further responses and produced documents but contends that she failed to provide any new responses to form interrogatories, contention interrogatories 1-4, 6-8, 10, 15-18, 21-22, or 26-27, or production requests and that these remain at issue. He notes that Respondent only served new responses to the other contention interrogatories while for the others she merely provided a verification and nothing more. He asserts that the verification does not alter the underlying defects in the responses, as detailed in his motion. He also contends that the document production is incomplete. Additionally, he argues that his motion was necessary and not premature, since he did not rush to file it but attempted to resolve the matter informally without success. Petitioner also requests additional sanctions for the time spent on the reply and hearing, with a supporting declaration.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided. This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

When a propounding party is dissatisfied with responses to interrogatories or requests for production or inspection (“RFP”), that party may move to compel further responses. CCP sections 2030.300, 2031.310. The moving party must make adequate attempts to meet and confer. Ibid. Generally, once a timely, proper motion to compel further responses has been made, the responding party has the burden to justify objections or incomplete answers. Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.

A party moving to compel further responses to a production request must demonstrate “good cause" for seeking the items. CCP section 2031.310(b)(1). This requires a showing that the items are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and a showing of specific facts justifying discovery. Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117. Whether there is an alternative source for the information is relevant though not dispositive. Associated Brewers Distrib. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 588. Once the moving party demonstrates good cause, the responding party must justify its objections. Kirkland v. Sup.Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.

A party has a duty to provide “complete” responses and to make them as straightforward as possible. CCP sections 2030.220; 2031.210-2031.230. Requests must be answered to the extent possible and an answer that contains only part of the information requested or which evades a meaningful response is improper. Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.

It is also not proper to respond by simply referring to other documents such as a deposition transcript. Deyo, supra. If a party does refer to other documents, it should generally also specify the source and summarize the information to make the response itself complete. Ibid.

A responding party has a duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to obtain the requested information and if it is unable to comply, it must state that it made a reasonable and diligent search. CCP sections 2030.220 2031.230; Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 783.

CCP section 2031.220 governs a statement of compliance with a production request. It states, in full,

A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.

CCP section 2031.230 governs responses containing a statement of inability to comply. It states, in pertinent part,

A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand… shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.

The responding party must verify substantive responses but not objections. CCP section 2030.250. Where a substantive response is unverified, the response is ineffective and is the equivalent of no response at all. See Appleton v Sup.Ct. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. However, a party need not verify responses consisting solely of objections, which only the attorney must sign. CCP section 2030.250(a), (c); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 339, 344.

Where a party has failed to respond to a request for production or the responses are considered inadequate, the first step is not to compel production but, as with interrogatories, to compel a response, and only once a party has obtained a response agreeing to produce items may the party seek production in compliance with that response. CCP sections 2031.300, 2031.310, 2031.320.

The discovery methods of serving a request for production and a deposition notice requiring production are separate and a party may seek information via both depositions and written discovery, even if arguably duplicative. See Carter v. Sup.Ct. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997. For example, where a party seeks to obtain documents via both deposition and requests for production, using one method “does not prescribe a waiver of the party’s right to use other discovery methods for obtaining the same documents or information.” Carter, 997.

Discussion

New Responses

Respondent demonstrates that, after Petitioner filed this motion, she served new responses with verifications as well as documents. This renders the motion moot as to those discovery items for which she provided new responses. Should Petitioner claim that the new responses or production are still defective as to those, Petitioner must bring a new motion to compel addressing the new responses and production.

However, this does not render the motion entirely moot. The motion is not moot as to those items for which Respondent provided no new responses. The verification does cure the prior failure to verify, but as Petitioner contends, it does not affect the responses themselves. Petitioner in his motion addressed not only the lack of verification but to the content of but the responses as well, providing full notice of the motion in that regard and presenting a full analysis for the court and Respondent to consider. Petitioner shows in his reply that, aside from the verification, Respondent did not provide any new responses to contention interrogatories 1-4, 6-8, 10, 15-18, 21-22, or 26-27. The motion is not moot as to those interrogatories. This also does not necessarily render Petitioner’s request for sanctions moot, since Petitioner may still be entitled to sanctions for the expenses of this motion despite the tardy new responses.

The court therefore must consider the sufficiency of the original responses and the substantive basis for the motion in order to assess the issue of sanctions. The court below discusses all of the discovery items at issue for completeness in determining the basic validity of the motion for purposes of sanctions. However, the motion is moot as to all for which Respondent did provide new responses in addition to verification.

Form Interrogatories

The interrogatories seek information facially relevant to the issues of support which are currently the subject of the upcoming trial. They seek information about other legal proceedings, support obligations, support provided form others, and the like.

Respondent objected to interrogatory 3 as not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. However, this seeks information about other anticipated legal proceedings, which could affect Respondent’s financial circumstances. This is directly relevant to the issues underlying a support determination.

Respondent submitted substantive responses to interrogatories 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20. These responses are ineffective because Respondent did not provide verification. The responses are also facially incomplete and evasive. The responses fail to address all of the information sought and they essentially just include a brief, basis statement telling Petitioner to refer to other documents or discovery responses, without any explanation or specification whatsoever.

The court finds the motion to be fully persuasive, and thus fully justified, regarding these. Respondent provided no new responses to these and did not even provide a verification for these. The court GRANTS the motion as to all of these.

Contention Interrogatories

The contention interrogatories seek facts supporting Respondent’s various contentions regarding the support issues. These by definition are facially directly relevant.

The responses again lack verification, rendering them ineffective and, in any case, are also incomplete on their face. The response to number 3, asking Respondent to identify those people with knowledge of her contention, merely refers to a witness list provided for the April 2026 trial. The others gave responses which are vague and on their face lack reference to the information requested or do not even give facts. For example, number 4 asks for facts supporting a contention that a specific payment to Petitioner is “income” for purposes of child support. Respondent, instead of providing facts, merely cites Fam. Code section 4058. In response to others, such as number 1 instead of providing facts as requested, Respondent merely refers vaguely to some unspecific documents and vaguely states “information regarding Petitioner’s lifestyle” or “information from witnesses” without stating what that information is. In response to others, such as 2 and 6, asking Respondent to identify documents supporting her contentions, Respondent merely provides vague, general categories of documents as well as “responses to written discovery” without actually identifying those documents or specific responses. Finally, in response to others, Respondent merely stated that she had not had enough time to formulate a response and reserved a right to supplement the response in a reasonable time. This clearly does not respond to the interrogatories and the statement does not absolve her of the obligation to provide a timely response.

The court likewise finds the motion to be fully persuasive, and thus fully justified, regarding these. The motion is GRANTED as to contention interrogatories 1-4, 6-8, 10, 15-18, 21-22, and 26-27, i.e., those for which Respondent provided no new responses. The motion is MOOT as to the others, for which Respondent did provide new responses, but the Court notes the motion was well founded as to them when filed.

Requests for Production

The RFPs at issue seek a range of financial records, including Respondent’s bank and credit card statements, pay or other income statements, employment agreements and the like, documents reflecting payments made for Respondent or on her behalf, loans, gifts, other transfers of money, investments, retirement accounts, records of profits and loss, tax documents, documents supporting Respondent’s various claimed costs and expenses as specified in the RFPs.

Respondent stated that she would comply in full with all of those at issue except for RFPs 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. However, she again failed to verify these, rendering them ineffective.

Those responses other than the ones to which she simply agree to comply are also defective. In response to RFP 10, she simply stated that she had already produced her tax returns. This response is defective because, as explained in the authority above, a response may not simply refer generally to other documents already produced without specification. Also, even if documents have been produced in response to other discovery, that does not render the later discovery improper or justify a refusal to respond again. In response to RFPs 12-16, Respondent objected on the ground that it is overbroad and unduly burdensome “in that it seeks duplicative documents containing the same information” and refers to other responses. This response is likewise defective for the same reasons. For the rest, Respondent simply stated that she could not comply because no such documents exist. As explained above, for such a response to be sufficient, it must provide an explanation, such as a statement that the responding party has made a diligent search. Respondent failed to provide such a statement.

Petitioner also explains how the new September production did not include all documents promised. He details which documents were not included in the production but which on their face are responsive to the requests. As he contends, Respondent agreed to produce the requested documents and yet she has failed to produce facially responsive documents which she promises to produce and she has provided no response explaining the failure to produce the missing documents.

Again, the court finds the motion to be fully persuasive, and thus fully justified, regarding these. Respondent provided no new responses to these aside from the verification. The court GRANTS the motion as to all of these.

Timing of, and Need for, the Motion

The defects in the original responses notwithstanding, Respondent contends that the motion was premature and unnecessary because she had fully intended to comply and Petitioner did not initially notify her that he had filed the motion.

Respondent’s argument is not persuasive. First, the motion was substantively justified, as explained above, because Respondent had failed to verify her responses, her objections and substantive responses were defective, and she had failed to provide documents as promised. Second, as set forth above, Petitioner shows that due to the defects in responses, the Petitioner contacted Respondent in an effort to resolve the matter informally, identifying what he considered to be the deficiencies for specific items, explaining why, and asking for further responses. Respondent replied that she was willing to provide further responses and asked for an additional 7 days to do so but, although Petitioner waited the 7 days, Respondent never provided any further responses, verification, or documents. After that 7-day period expired, on August 17, 2026, Petitioner contacted Respondent by e-mail explaining the situation, again seeking new responses, and warning that he would need to file the motion. Respondent, however, still provided no new responses, verification, or production. Respondent in her opposition does not dispute these basic facts and admits that Petitioner had warned her that he would need to file the instant motion in order to ensure that he did not miss the deadline for doing so, and he stated that he would still be willing to consider informal resolution. Respondent also admits that although she served further responses eventually, she did not do so until September 9, 2026, more than two weeks after Petitioner had filed this motion, and about one week after she claims that she learned that he had filed the motion. The undisputed history of the discovery therefore demonstrates that the motion was not only fully justified in substance, but reasonably necessary, and that Petitioner was fully justified in filing it when he did. That he did not give immediate notice after filing the motion on August 21, 2026 is immaterial. The motion was, due to the court’s calendaring, initially set for February 2027 and he provided notice with his ex parte application for an order shortening time and advancing the hearing, serving the moving papers in accord with the court’s order on the ex parte application.

Moreover, as Petitioner demonstrates in his reply, Respondent in fact provided no new responses to most of the discovery at issue. For those, she did nothing more than provide the belated verification, leaving the other issues unresolved.

The court finds the motion to have been fully and reasonably justified and necessary, and not to have been premature.

Sanctions

For compelling further responses, the court shall impose monetary sanctions on the losing party unless that party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make sanctions unjust. CCP sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2031.310. In order to obtain sanctions, the moving party must state in the notice of motion that the party is seeking sanctions, identify against whom the party seeks the sanctions, and specify the kind of sanctions. CCP section 2023.040. Sanctions are limited to the “reasonable expenses” related to the motion. Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.

As explained above, the court finds the motion to have been fully justified and reasonably necessary. Respondent’s further responses were late and served only after she had received notice that Petitioner had filed this motion. The court finds Petitioner to be entitled to an award of sanctions, leaving only ethe amount in question.

Petitioner’ original motion seeks monetary sanctions of $6,000 plus $10,230 in attorney’s fees, with the supporting evidence set forth in the Declaration of Brian P. Lanz in Support of Petitioner’s Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs as Sanctions. He claims attorney’s fees at $400 an hour plus paralegal fees at $200 an hour. These rates are reasonable and within the local range of rates for this type of litigation. The fees sought include $935 in preparing the discovery. Those fees are generally not recoverable as sanctions on a motion to compel since they are simply part of the discovery, not expenses of bringing the motion to compel or otherwise obtaining compliance. The court excludes those expenses. Petitioner also shows that he incurred attorney and paralegal fees of $2,820 for reviewing the responses and preparing the meet-and-confer letter. Again, the time spent reviewing the responses is simply an inherent aspect of discovery and ordinarily not proper to include in an award of sanctions. Petitioner provides no explanation to support including that time in sanctions. Time spent meeting and conferring in order to obtain compliance is, however, appropriate to include in sanctions since it is time spent attempting to resolve the matter without a motion. Petitioner does not detail the fees but, absent other evidence, the court finds one hour of attorney time, $400, to be facially reasonable for preparing the meet-and-confer letter and therefore awards this amount. Petitioner also seeks $3,675 for the work preparing the moving papers. This is a reasonable amount of fees for such a motion and these expenses are properly recoverable as sanctions. The court grants the motion as to this amount.

Petitioner also anticipated additional time and expense for the reply and hearing. The court reiterates that it may only impose sanctions for expenses both reasonably and actually incurred but that it could consider evidence that Petitioner has incurred additional expenses which it may add to the sanctions award. Petitioner has provided to the court a declaration setting forth the additional time and expense related to the reply and hearing. He now shows in the Declaration of Brian P. Lanz in Support of Petitioner’s Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs as Sanctions filed on September 22, 2026, that he has incurred an additional $4,300 in attorney and paralegal fees, for hours detailed specifically in the declaration. This includes time spent comparing the new responses to the old ones, considering which documents had been produced or not, determining the extent to which the new responses and production cured the defects in the prior responses, conferring with Respondent’s counsel over the issues, and preparing the reply papers. This time is facially reasonable and necessary. The court also grants the requested sanctions in this amount.

The Court also analyzes the facts of noncompliance to Petitioner’s discovery demands by Respondent under section 271 of the family code. Here, the court finds an additional sanction of $3000 for each category [Form Interrogatories, Contention Interrogatories or RFPs, ($6000 in total)] of no response, absent validation or non-code-complaint answer or meritless objections is necessary. The Court awards to Petitioner as an incentive to the respondent to cease the sort of discovery practice and tactics revealed in the facts of this case. This is the type of conduct and practice that section 271 specifically prohibits. This amount is calculated to inspire Respondent to avoid such litigation conduct in the future.

Accordingly, the court AWARDS to Petitioner, against Respondent, total sanctions of $14,375.

Conclusion

The motion is MOOT as to compelling responses and production. However, the court GRANTS the motion as to an award of sanctions. The court AWARDS to Petitioner, against Respondent, total sanctions of $14,375. Said sanctions are due and payable to Petitioner through his attorney’s office by November 3, 2026 at 5pm. Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

It is SO ORDERED.