Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 20

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1. SFL 090388 RODAS DE LEON DISSOLUTION

Motion to Quash Petitioner’s Discovery Requests or for Protective Order; Referral to Discovery Facilitator Program DENIED IN PART.  The court DENIES the motion as to the supplemental requests, the RFAs and the form interrogatories, with the qualification set forth below. 

            With respect to the special interrogatories and requests for production, the court REFERS the matter to a DISCOVERY REFEREE.  The parties are directed to present to the court an agreed-upon referee or nominees in accordance with CCP section 640, governing the selection of a referee. 

Facts

            Petitioner Carmela Rodas De Leon (“Petitioner”) initiated this action for dissolution of marriage with minor child (the “Child”) against Respondent, Engley Melby De Leon (“Respondent”).

Discovery

            On or about September 25, 2025, Petitioner served Respondent with requests for responses to 49 Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), 9 Form Interrogatories, 5 Requests for Admissions (“RFAs”), and 141 Special interrogatories (collectively, the “New Discovery”). Petitioner also requested supplemental responses to previously served discovery (“Supplemental Discovery”).  The RFPs seek documents relating to responses to various specified RFAs and interrogatories. 

            On October 30, 2025, Respondent filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Quash Petitioner’s Discovery Requests or for Protective Order; Referral to Discovery Facilitator Program.  Respondent requested that the Court enter a protective order restricting Petitioner’s discovery requests. Respondent contended that the requests are excessive, duplicative of prior discovery, and unduly burdensome. Respondent also requested sanctions under the Discovery Act for having to bring the motion.

            Petitioner opposed the motion, averring that Respondent’s production thus far had produced financial inconsistencies requiring further discovery. Petitioner presented documentary evidence of enormous cash flow to and from Respondent’s accounts, several times Respondent’s claimed income on his Income and Expense Declarations (“IEDs”). Petitioner argued that the discovery requested was clearly targeted toward obtaining information regarding the cash flow discrepancies. Petitioner asserted that good cause had therefore been met.

            Shortly before the hearing on the motion, on February 17, 2026, Respondent changed attorneys, with a new attorney, Matthew Briggs (“Briggs”), substituting in to replace the attorneys who had represented him up to that point, Rachel Castrejon (“Castrejon”) and Jason Shane (“Shane”). 

            No party appeared for the February 27, 2026 hearing on the motion, after which the court adopted its tentative ruling continuing the motion to May 15, 2026.  The court explained that it was continuing the motion because the parties failed to meet and confer sufficiently, with evidence showing only one brief request from Respondent that Petitioner withdraw the discovery, without any proposals for limiting the discovery, and no response to that from Petitioner, who refused to modify the discovery.  The court ordered the parties to meet and confer prior to the new hearing. 

            Respondent filed two supplemental declarations on May 11, 2026 (“Supplemental Declarations”), before the May hearing.  Petitioner filed no new papers regarding the motion.  At the hearing on May 15, 2026, the parties and their attorneys appeared pursuant to the tentative ruling requiring appearances.  The court addressed the matter but continued it to August 7, 2026.  No party has filed any new documents on the motion since the May hearing date. 

Motion

            The matter is once again on calendar for Respondent’s Motion to Quash Petitioner’s Discovery Requests or for Protective Order; Referral to Discovery Facilitator Program, continued from the prior hearings.  The only new papers filed since the original hearing are, as noted above, Respondent’s Supplemental Declarations.  Accordingly, the arguments and evidence remain the same as before.  Respondent contends that the requests are excessive, duplicative of prior discovery, and unduly burdensome. Respondent also requests sanctions under the Discovery Act for having to bring the motion.

            Petitioner’s opposition is the same as filed prior to the original hearing and, as noted, she has added nothing since then.  She contends that Respondent’s production thus far has produced financial inconsistencies which require investigation and further discovery. Petitioner presents documentary evidence of enormous cash flow to and from Respondent’s accounts, several times Respondent’s claimed income on his IEDs. Petitioner argues that the discovery requested is clearly targeted toward obtaining information regarding the cash flow discrepancies. Petitioner avers that good cause has therefore been met.

            Respondent has filed reply papers reiterating his position.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

            A party may obtain a protective order since the court “for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party... from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.”   CCP sections 2017.020; 2019.030; 2025.420; 2030.090; 2031.060; 2033.080(b).

            The right to discovery is generally liberally construed. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540. “California law provides parties with expansive discovery rights.”  Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 590-591.  Specifically, the Code provides that “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  CCP section 2017.010; see also, Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 712, fn. 8. (“For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement…”)  See Lopez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 590-591, citing Garamendi, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 712, fn. 8. “Admissibility is not the test and information[,] unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” Id. “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” Id. Good cause can be met through showing specific facts of the case and the relevance of the requested information. Associated Brewers Distributing Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586–587. “(T)he good cause which must be shown should be such that will satisfy an impartial tribunal that the request may be granted without abuse of the inherent rights of the adversary. There is no requirement, or necessity, for a further showing.” Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court In and For Merced County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 388. As the right to discovery is liberally construed, so too is good cause. Id at 377-378. Generally, failure to assert a discovery objection in a response waives that objection later. Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1140. “When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an intent to harass and improperly burden.” Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.

            Parties are required to meet and confer in a manner which is a good faith attempt to resolve issues, and not just an attempt to convince the other side of their own position. Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294. 

            A party may serve “supplemental” interrogatories and production requests to obtain information acquired after the responses to the original interrogatories and may do so twice before the initial setting of the trial date and once after the initial setting.  CCP sections 2030.070, 2031.050.

According to CCP section 2030.030(c), a party need not answer special interrogatories over 35 unless the propounding party has provided a declaration of necessity but the responding party must respond to the first 35.  When a party provides a declaration of necessity, the responding party may challenge it by a motion for protective order.  CCP section 2030.090; see Catanese v. Sup.Ct. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.

Similarly, although there is no limit on the number of RFAs regarding the genuineness of documents, there is a limit of 35 other RFAs by and to each party unless the party seeking the discovery provides a declaration of necessity.  CCP section 2033.030(a), (b). 

Discovery of financial information is inherently directly relevant and appropriate in family law litigation involving disputes over financial matters such as income, assets, debts, and support.  See, e.g., Fam.Code sections 2100, 2100, 2120; Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App. 4th 1470, 1476-1477; CRC 5.92.  In family law disputes, Fam.Code sections 2100 and 2120(a) expressly codify public policy requiring full and accurate disclosure of assets, liabilities, income and expenses to ensure a proper division of the community estate and “fair and sufficient” child and spousal support awards.  As a result, there is inherently and expressly a “compelling public interest” in discovery of such information which overcomes each party’s right to privacy in their personal financial information.  See, e.g., Schnabel v. Sup.Ct. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711; City of Los Angeles v. Sup.Ct. (2003) 111 Cal.App. 4th 883, 894-896 (disapproved on other grounds by International Federation of Prof. & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Sup.Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 345) (stating that privacy rights granted peace officers over their personnel records give way to Family Code requirements of full financial disclosure during marital dissolution proceedings between peace officer and spouse.

Therefore, in a family law dispute, each party’s financial records and information, such as business records and tax returns, are directly relevant to determination of issues such as property division, spousal support, and child support, and therefore discoverable.  Schnabel v. Sup.Ct. (Schnabel) (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711; see also Thomas B. v. Sup.Ct. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 255, 264 (in litigation regarding child support, a party generally has a right to discover the other party’s financial information and obtain financial records, although ordinarily only records extending back up to about five years could be considered relevant).  Discovery even of indirect property interests is therefore proper in such matters. Thomas B., supra, 263.  In Thomas B., the appellate court found it appropriate to allow discovery of the other party’s “accounting records relating to all real estate rental propert[y] in which [the other party] had either a direct or indirect financial interest” on the grounds that it was within the allowable scope of discovery as “relevant to the subject matter”; i.e., the other party’s ability to pay. 

CRC 3.1345(a) expressly states, “Except as provided in (b), any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement.”  Subdivision (b) states that no such statement is required on a motion to compel where there has been no response, or where the court has allowed a party to submit a “concise outline” in lieu of a separate statement.  The separate statement must specifically set forth the full text of each request at issue; the full response, if any; the factual and legal reasons supporting the party’s argument; and other specified information as necessary.  Subdivision (d) adds, “A motion concerning interrogatories, inspection demands, or admission requests must identify the interrogatories, demands, or requests by set and number.”

Referee

Even when parties do not agree to the appointment of a referee, the court may appoint one on the motion of any party or on its own motion where a referee is “necessary” to hear and determine all discovery disputes.  CCP section 639(a)(5); CRC 3.920, 3.921 .  The order must set forth the exceptional circumstances justifying the appointment; the scope of the reference; the referee’s name, etc.; the referee’s powers and report requirements; and objection requirements; the fees; and a specific finding regarding the parties’ ability to pay.  CCP section 639(d); CRC 3.920(c), 3.922.  

Such orders are generally improper where only routine discovery matters are at issue and there must be “exceptional circumstances.”  CRC 3.920(c); see also Hood v. Sup.Ct. (1999) 762 Cal.App.4th 446, 449.  Courts have thus stated that there is no basis for appointing a referee to resolve uncomplicated or routine disputes.  Tagares v. Sup.Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 94, 104; Hood, supra.  “Unusual” circumstances warranting an appointment of a discovery referee include multiple issues to resolve; multiple motions being heard simultaneously; there is a long string of discovery motions; there are numerous and voluminous documents to examine, making an inquiry “inordinately time consuming.”  Tagares , supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 105.  

Meeting and Conferring

            As explained above, the court previously continued the matter, ultimately to this hearing date, for the parties to meet and confer, since there was no indication of any meaningful informal resolution effort by either party.  Following that original continuance, the moving party, Respondent, filed two declarations, one from himself and one from his new attorney, Briggs, prior to the May 2026 hearing.  He has filed nothing since the continuance from the May hearing.  Petitioner has filed no new papers regarding this motion since the original hearing and has thus not updated her meet-and-confer discussion. 

            In his Supplemental Declarations filed on May 11, 2026, before the May hearing, Respondent details his meet-and-confer efforts following the original hearing.  He shows that he sent a letter on March 13, 2026, explaining his arguments and position regarding the discovery and offering to provide limited responses regarding specific transactions instead of new wholesale responses to all of the transactions in the applicable period.  Petitioner in response presented arguments in support of the full discovery and requested full responses to all of the discovery, refusing to limit the discovery. 

            There appears now to have been sufficient effort to meet and confer, albeit without any compromise or alteration on the part of either party.

Declaration of Necessity for Additional Discovery

            As noted above, a party may only propound more than 35 special interrogatories or RFAs other than RFAs regarding genuineness of documents if the party provides a declaration of necessity for the additional discovery.  Petitioner did so, satisfying this element.

Supplemental Discovery

            There is no basis for a protective order regarding the requests for supplemental responses.  As noted above, a party is entitled to serve such a request seeking new information which may have been obtained since the prior responses.

The New Discovery

RFAs

            At issues are 5 RFAs, although the motion only clearly seeks a protective order regarding RFA 2, which seeks information on a deed signed “on X date,” for the reason that it is unintelligible.  Respondent is correct as to the defect in RFA 2, with the “X date” making it unclear and the court can discern no resolution to this as of yet. If the matter has been resolved, then the court will deny the motion as to RFA 2 if the RFA 2 has been corrected to set forth a specific, clear, intelligible date.  Otherwise, the court will GRANT the motion as to RFA 2, without prejudice to Petitioner resubmitting an intelligible RFA.  Otherwise, the court DENIES the motion as to the other RFAs, which all on their face seek directly relevant financial information, and which are not facially onerous, unreasonable, or overly numerous.  

Form Interrogatories

            The only substantive form interrogatory at issue is 17.1, seeking the standard information regarding the RFA responses which are not unqualified admissions.  The RFAs, as noted above, appear facially directly relevant, limited, and reasonable.  The court DENIES the motion as to the form interrogatories. 

Special Interrogatories

            The special interrogatories are particularly numerous and detailed.  On their face, they seek information of a type which is clearly directly relevant to this litigation, Respondent’s financial dealings.  Respondent’s financial dealings appear to be complex, involving business finances such as employee payments, payments to non-employees for business purposes, jobsites for his business, real property which Respondent owns, and more.  The questions are unusually numerous.  They are also, however, very specific and appear to be closely tailored to specific aspects of Respondent’s finances.  Given the evidence which Respondent presents showing discrepancies between information already obtained regarding Respondent’s cash flow and his income as presented in his IEDs, there appears to be good basis for such discovery.  Respondent merely claims that the requests are overly numerous and duplicative of prior discovery, but he fails to provide clear, specific information actually demonstrating that the requests are truly duplicative.  The interrogatories themselves are not duplicative on their face as they seek different specific information.  They also appear clear and intelligible on their face.  Respondent has failed to provide any clear explanation to the contrary. 

            The court’s view of the requests for the production is similar to the special interrogatories.  They are numerous and seek detailed, specific documents, and they appear valid on their face and seek directly relevant information.  They are also tailored to the specific other discovery requests. 

            Given the nature of the complicated discovery issues, the court finds sufficient basis to appoint a discovery referee pursuant to the authority set forth above.  The voluminous, highly detailed nature of the discovery, the complicated financial subject matter and business dealings, the combination of the two types of discovery, the substantial finances at issue, the necessity of comparing the New Discovery with the prior discovery in order to determine if it is reasonable or truly duplicative or unreasonable or necessary, and the need to consider the context of the disparities between discovery so far and Respondent’s declared income, amount to exceptional circumstances.    The referee will be appointed solely for the purposes of this discovery dispute regarding these special interrogatories and RFPs.      

Conclusion

            The court DENIES the motion as to the supplemental requests, the RFAs and the form interrogatories, with the qualification set forth above.  With respect to the special interrogatories and requests for production, the court REFERS the matter to a DISCOVERY REFEREE.  The parties are directed to present to the court an agreed-upon referee or nominees in accordance with CCP section 640, governing the selection of a referee. 

            The court DENIES all requests for sanctions or attorney’s fees and costs.  At this time, the court finds some substantial justification for both parties’ positions, and some lack of justification.  The court therefore here decides the issue of sanctions or fees and costs, which is not being referred to the referee. 

           

2. 25FL02585 DENNIS DISSOLUTION

Motion to Quash Service of Summons due to improper service DENIED for the reasons stated below.

 

Facts

            Petitioner filed her petition for dissolution of marriage without minor children on December 10, 2025.  The petition seeks determinations of separate, community, and quasi-community property.  The same date, she filed form FL-160 property declarations and a form FL-150 income and expense declaration (“IED”).  She filed her form FL-141 declaration regarding service of the declaration of disclosure and IED on January 21, 2026, showing that she personally served these on Respondent on January 14, 2026.  She filed proof of service for the summons and petition on January 22, 2026, showing personal service on Respondent on January 14, 2026, at 6956 W Wise Rd, Lincoln, CA.

            Respondent had failed to appear by February 26, 2026, when Petitioner requested entry of default.  The court entered Respondent’s default as requested.   On April 29, 2026, the court entered judgment upon the default based on Petitioner’s request. 

            Respondent filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Quash Service of Summons due to improper service, moving the court to set aside the default judgment and quash service of the summons and petition alleging he had not been properly served and did not have the full required time for responding.  He contended that the petition and summons “were left outside in the open under a fire pit on the front porch of [his] residence… unbeknownst to” him, and the papers were not handed to him or anyone else in the residence.  He asserted that he later discovered the documents but did not state when.  He then allegedly compiled the necessary information and drove to Santa Rosa to file his response, but the clerk told him that he needed to serve Petitioner before filing.  He claimed that he served Petitioner that same day but by then the courthouse was closed.  He asserted that he tried to file the response again the next day only to have the clerk start to process the response but then inform him that Petitioner had just obtained a default.  

            After the hearing, the court denied the motion, explaining that Respondent had failed to provide sufficient information to find his assertions to be credible or persuasive.  It noted that the court record showed facially valid, proper service, and that it found the statements of the process server to be credible. 

Motion

            In a new Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Quash Service of Summons due to improper service, Respondent once more moves the court to set aside the default judgment and quash service of the summons and petition based on the fact that he had not been properly served and did not have the full required time for responding.  His arguments, factual assertions, and evidence are identical to the prior motion which this court already denied.  He contends that the petition and summons “were left outside in the open under a fire pit on the front porch of [his] residence… unbeknownst to” him, and the papers were not handed to him or anyone else in the residence.  He claims that upon discovering the “weathered” documents, he “immediately began to compile the necessary information and on Wednesday, February 25, 2026, drove from Lincoln to Santa Rosa to file his response.  He contends that when he tried to file the response, the clerk told him that he needed to serve Petitioner before filing, so he immediately drove to her work in Petaluma to personally serve her, before driving back to the courthouse to find it closed.  He then returned home to Lincoln and the next day, February 26, 2026, returned to Santa Rosa to file the response and proof of service.  As the clerk was processing his documents, he contends, she received an alert that Petitioner had just filed the default, so the clerk told him that she was unable to complete filing the response.  He asserts that Petitioner entered the default “within 30 days” of him discovering the summons and petition and contends that he therefore had less than the required 30 days from discovery the documents, but he does not state when he discovered the documents.  

            Petitioner opposes the motion.  She contends that she hired ABC Legal to serve the summons and complaint and that the proof of service for these shows proper personal service.  She also argues that the motion to quash is untimely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 412.20, and Respondent had sufficient notice and opportunity to respond to the petition.  She also contends that she was in Las Vegas on the date on which Respondent claims to have personally served her. 

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

            Relief from orders, due to default or otherwise, in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691.  In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 910-911. 

CCP section 473(b) allows plaintiffs and defendants to set aside dismissals or defaults based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  CCP section 473(b).    “[D]iscretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.”  English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 149; see also Las Vegas Land & Development Co., LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1086, at 1092-1093 (quoting and relying on English).

This motion must normally be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed 6 months from the date the order was entered.  CCP section 473(b).  The motion must be brought within 6 months and the grounds for seeking the relief do not affect the deadline.  Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 345. 

CCP section 473.5 provides the authority for setting aside a default or default judgment where service of the summons did not provide actual notice in time to defend the action.  This motion must be brought within a reasonable time not more than the earlier of 2 years after entry of default judgment or 180 days after service of written notice of default.  CCP section 473.5.  This is in contrast to motions under CCP section 473(b), which must be filed within 6 months of the entry of the order or default or judgment, whichever is at issue.

Section 473.5 provides relief where service may have been proper but did not result in actual notice in time to defend the action.  See Randall v. Randall (1928) 203 Cal.462, 464-465.  The defendant or respondent is thus entitled to relief as long as the party did not receive actual notice, and imputed or constructive notice does not suffice.  Rosenthal v. Garner (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 891, 895.  However, the party must show that the lack of notice was not the result of inexcusable neglect or avoidance of service on his or her part.  Tunis v. Barrow (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1077-1078.  Upon finding that defendant lacked notice in time to defend and that the lack of notice was not the result of the defendant’s neglect or avoidance of service, the court may set aside the default or default judgment “on whatever terms as may be just.”  CCP section 473.5(d).

The moving party “shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.”  CCP section 473.5(b).  In contrast to a motion under CCP section 473(b), however, this requirement lacks the language stating “otherwise the application shall not be granted.”

A judgment may be set aside where void pursuant to CCP section 473(d).  Such an order may apply where there is lack of actual or constructive notice and no valid service.     Lovato v. Santa Fe Int’l Corp. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 549, 553 (void for lack of notice where discovery requests served only on defendant’s attorney, who had been suspended by state bar and lacked authority to represent party); Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 313 (lack of proper service renders judgment void).  Where the judgment is void, the moving party need not show a meritorious defense.  CCP section 473(d); Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 86-87.  However, where the motion is based on lack of, or improper, service, where there has been actual notice, substantial compliance with the service requirements will defeat a motion to vacate.  Gibble, supra.       

CCP section 418.10(a)(1) states that a defendant or respondent, on or before the last day to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion to quash service of summons on the ground the court lacks jurisdiction.

Personal service is complete and proper where the defendant tries to avoid or refuse service as long as the server identifies himself or herself, tells the party that he or she is being served with process, and leaves the papers as close as possible to the recipient.  Trujillo v. Trujillo (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 257, 260.  As long as defendant or respondent receives actual notice of the lawsuit, substantial compliance with the service requirements is sufficient.  Pasadena Medi-Center Associates v. Sup.Ct. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778.  On the other hand, where the party is not knowingly attempting to evade or refuse service, it is improper simply to leave the papers with near the person or with someone else in the vicinity.  Sternbeck v. Buck (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 833. 

Discussion

            Respondent does not set forth the authority for this motion, but he does expressly state that he is moving the court to vacate the default judgment and to quash service.  The governing authority for such relief is set forth above.

            In summary, as noted above, Respondent’s new motion appears to be identical to the prior motion, which this court denied, in all respects.  He presents the exact same arguments, factual assertions, and evidence, and the papers appear in all other respects to be identical.  He provides nothing new and neither requests reconsideration under CCP section 1008 nor presents any evidence which could support reconsideration.  This is a mere repeat of the prior, failed motion.  For the reasons already set forth in the court’s prior order, the court DENIES the motion.  That said, the court reiterates its analysis, which remains unaltered, below. 

 

Sufficiency of Service and Notice

            That said, the court finds there to have been adequate notice and proper service of the summons and petition.  Although Respondent raises a potentially valid argument and circumstances, he fails to present sufficient evidence, detail, or explanation to be persuasive.  For example, he does not state when he discovered the summons and petition, and he does not directly refute the process server’s statement that he personally served Respondent at the residence.  He also admits that the service took place at his residence.  Moreover, even if Respondent’s moving papers were sufficiently persuasive and credible, the record of the proof of service combined with Petitioner’s evidence persuades this court that Respondent was properly served by personal service and had actual notice in time.  The filed proof of service on its face shows proper, valid personal service.  Petitioner, in her opposition, also includes additional evidence from the process server which is consistent with the stated service and demonstrates proper personal service.  These include the process server’s detailed records with a statement describing the service, circumstances, person served, and location.  The records show that the person served knew of the server, talked to the server was told of the service, tried to refuse service, and refused to take the documents.  They show that the server then, in view of the person being served, left the documents at the residence.  The records include photographs of the residence and the events of the service.  The court finds Petitioner’s evidence and the information from the neutral process server to be credible, complete, and detailed, while Respondent’s statements conflict with this more detailed and documented evidence and lack enough detail to be credible or persuasive. 

Other Grounds to Vacate the Default Judgment

            Respondent contends that he tried to file his response as soon as he could after obtaining the necessary information, but he is not persuasive that the default was entered despite his due diligence.  Respondent does show a potentially valid basis for setting aside the default with respect to his failed efforts to file the response resulting in a default being entered as he was trying to file the response affiant the next day.  However, he admits that his initial effort to file the response was already more than 10 days after the 30-day deadline for responding and, as noted, he fails to state when he discovered the service or otherwise contradict Petitioner’s showing of proper service and notice on January 14, 2026, approximately 42 days earlier.  His claim that he was delayed by personally serving his response on Petitioner lacks credibility in light of Petitioner’s evidence, including copies of airfare and flight information, showing that she had left on a flight to Las Vegas that day and did not return until the next day.

            Under the circumstances, the court finds Respondent’s request to set aside the default judgment to lack sufficient credibility and persuasiveness, even though it states a potentially valid basis for such relief. 

Conclusion

At this time, no part of this motion is sufficiently credible or persuasive and the opposition, by contrast, has the support of clear court records and more detailed complete information and documentary support.  Had Respondent provided more complete details, evidence, and explanation, the court may have been inclined to grant the motion at least with respect to setting aside the default judgment even if it had not quashed the service, but it finds Respondent insufficiently credible. 

The court DENIES the motion in full. The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

           

3. 25FL01186 KIMANI/JOHNSON DISSOLUTION

DENIED; Petitioner provided no evidence that she has served Respondent with her preliminary declarations of disclosure, nor has she filed her required form FL-141 Declaration Regarding Service of Declaration of Disclosure and Income and Expense Declaration with the Court.