Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 20

Commissioner Megan Amaral

Law & Motion Calendar

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707)-521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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Law & Motion Tentative Rulings

October 2, 2026
9:30am

FOR ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTS - PLEASE CALL THE COVERING JUDICIAL ASSISTANT AT (707) 521-6729.

1. 24FL00588, Kellison Dissolution

Respondent’s Request for Order is dropped from the court’s calendar for failure to timely serve the Request for Order and failure to timely file the requisite Proof of Service with the court.

2. 25FL02585, Dennis Dissolution

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment GRANTED.

Facts

Petitioner Desiree Noel Dennis (“Petitioner”) filed her petition for dissolution of marriage without minor children on December 10, 2025. The petition seeks determinations of separate, community, and quasi-community property. The same date, she filed form FL-160 property declarations and a form FL-150 income and expense declaration (“IED”). She filed her form FL-141 declaration regarding service of the declaration of disclosure and IED on January 21, 2026, showing that she personally served these on Respondent Robert Wesley Dennis (“Respondent”) on January 14, 2026. She filed proof of service for the summons and petition on January 22, 2026, showing personal service on Respondent on January 14, 2026, at 6956 W Wise Rd, Lincoln, CA.

Respondent had failed to appear by February 26, 2026, when Petitioner requested entry of default. The court entered Respondent’s default as requested. On April 29, 2026, the court entered judgment upon the default based on Petitioner’s request.

Respondent filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Quash Service of Summons (the “First Motion to Quash”) due to improper service, moving the court to set aside the default judgment and quash service of the summons and petition based on the fact that he had not been properly served and did not have the full required time for responding. He contended that the petition and summons “were left outside in the open under a fire pit on the front porch of [his] residence… unbeknownst to” him, and the papers were not handed to him or anyone else in the residence. He asserted that he later discovered the documents but did not state when. He then allegedly compiled the necessary information and drove to Santa Rosa to file his response, but the clerk told him that he needed to serve Petitioner before filing. He claimed that he served Petitioner that same day but by then the courthouse was closed. He asserted that he tried to file the response again the next day only to have the clerk start to process the response but then inform him that Petitioner had just obtained a default.

After the hearing on June 5, 2026, the court denied the motion, explaining that Respondent had failed to provide sufficient information to find his assertions to be credible or persuasive. It noted that the court record showed facially valid, proper service, and that it found the statements of the process server to be credible.

On the very date of the hearing on the First Motion to Quash, Respondent filed a second RFO and Motion to Quash Service of Summons (the “Second Motion to Quash”) due to improper service, once more moving the court to set aside the default judgment and quash service of the summons and petition based on the fact that he had not been properly served and did not have the full required time for responding. His arguments, factual assertions, and evidence were identical to the prior motion which this court already denied.

After the hearing of August 7, 2026, the court denied the Second Motion to Quash. The court explained that the Second Motion to Quash was in all ways identical to the first and denied it for the same reasons.

Meanwhile, on June 29, 2026, Respondent filed an appeal of the April 29, 2026, default judgment. However, the court of appeal dismissed the appeal on August 21, 2026, due to failure to pay the filing fee.

Motion

In a new RFO and Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Respondent now moves the court to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

Petitioner opposes the motion. She contends that Respondent had actual notice of the proceedings and has failed to establish the criteria for relief under section 473(b).

Respondent has filed a brief reply, mostly arguing the underlying issues of property valuation which are to be addressed in the response and subsequent litigation, and which have no direct bearing on the outcome of this motion.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided. This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

Reconsideration and Renewal: CCP section 1008

Following a court’s ruling on a motion, a party may bring a motion satisfying CCP section 1008 for reconsideration or renewal of the prior order and to modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.

Any party affected by the prior order may bring a motion for reconsideration pursuant to CCP section 1008(a) within 10 days following entry of the order. CCP section 1008. A renewal or renewed motion, under CCP section 1008(b), is similar to a motion for reconsideration, except that it must be brought by the original moving party and lacks the 10-day deadline applicable to reconsideration. A party bringing any motion in accordance with CCP section 1008 must show what application the party made before, when and to what judge, and what the ruling was. A party seeking reconsideration or a renewed motion also must first demonstrate new facts, law, or circumstances that were not previously considered. CCP section 1008; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 692. The moving party must also provide an adequate explanation why the new information was not provided earlier. Garcia, supra; Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500. The need for an explanation is a requirement for due diligence. Gilberd.

Mere lack of a chance to make oral argument is not a valid basis for a motion for reconsideration. Garcia, 691; Gilberd, 1500. In addition, decisions such as Film Packages, Inc. v. Brandywine Film Productions, Ltd. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 824, at 829, and Pender v. Radin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1807, at 1811-1812, ruled that evidence was “new” since it was since obtained through discovery and could not reasonably have been provided earlier.

Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration must be heard by the “same judge or court” that made the original order. CCP section 1008. Although normally a trial judge may not reconsider and overturn another trial judge’s order, “an exception to this rule applies where the judge who made the initial ruling is unavailable.” Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4^th 449, 454-455; see also Davcon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1362, and International Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4^th 784, 786.

The purpose of the rules in section 1008 is to conserve court resources by preventing repeated, duplicative motions on issues already decided. See, e.g., Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 277; UAS Management, Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hospital (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 357.

Section 1008 does not limit the court’s inherent power to reexamine its interim rulings on its own motion and enter a new and different order prior to entry of judgment. LeFrancois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107; Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1156-1157. The court must act sua sponte, but this can be on its own motion or as the result of a party’s request. LeFrancois, supra, 1108. Such a request can be informal. Ibid.

Vacating Defaults and Default Judgments

Relief from support orders, due to default or otherwise, in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691. In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911; see also CRC 5.2(d) (provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided).

CCP section 473(b) allows parties to set aside dismissals or defaults, or the functional equivalent thereof, based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. CCP section 473(b). “[D]iscretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.” English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 149; see also Las Vegas Land & Development Co., LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1086, at 1092-1093 (quoting and relying on English). The motion “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed… otherwise the application shall not be granted….” CCP section 473(b).

An order setting aside the default is discretionary whereas based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. CCP section 473(b).

There is also a policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits and the motion to vacate should be granted if the moving party shows a credible, excusable explanation. Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227. The provision of this section authorizing court to relieve party from a judgment or order resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is remedial in its nature and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases on their merits. Ramsey Trucking Co. v. Mitchell (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d Supp. 862.

“Surprise” is “some condition or situation in which a party... is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Calif. v. National Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173.

“Excusable neglect” comes down to whether the moving party has shown a reasonable excuse for the default. Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905. The moving party must show that the default would not have been avoided through ordinary care. Elms v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513. The test ultimately is thus one of reasonable diligence. Jackson v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 55, 58. A showing that the defendant was unable to understand what he was served with is sufficient to justify relief. Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208. Another valid basis is if the defendant mislaid or misfiled the papers and as a result failed to obtain an attorney in time. Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683-686. Simply forgetting about the lawsuit or being too “busy” is not adequate. Andrews v. Jacoby (1919) 39 Cal.App. 382, 383-384. Excusable neglect by attorneys includes situations where, despite reasonable supervision, an attorney’s secretary misfiled papers or failed to enter an appearance date. Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 234; Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273.

In addition to relief based on CCP section 473, a court may set aside a judgment adjudicating support or the division of property in accord with Family code section 2120, et seq., and 3691. Family Code sections 2120, 2121; see also In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (Fam. Code section 2122 governs relief from judgment while Fam. Code section 3691 governs relief from support orders other than judgment); see also In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620. Fam. Code section 3690 provides the basis for relief under section 3691 after the expiration of the deadline in CCP section 473.

Service and Notice

There is no proof of service showing service of the filed motion or notice of the hearing date, but Petitioner has opposed the motion on the merits without objecting to lack of notice or service. The court also notes that neither party has provided proof of service for the opposition or reply papers. Respondent’s reply addresses the opposition on the merits without raising service as an issue, curing that defect, but the reply is ineffective due to the lack of proof of service for it. That said, the reply does not affect the outcome of this motion.

Discussion

In summary, Respondent’s new motion once appears to be similar to the prior motions, which this court denied, but with some significant differences.

The two prior motions lacked any indication of the authority or legal grounds for relief, as well as any clear explanation of what Respondent was truly requesting. This impaired the motions and made it impossible for the court to determine the nature of the motions or requested relief with certainty. Moreover, Respondent’s two prior motions were labelled as motions to quash and in them Respondent specifically asked the court to quash service of the summons and complaint. He also based those motions primarily on the claim that he had not been personally served and did not know of the service in time to prepare his response.

This motion is specifically and solely a motion to set aside the default judgment. Respondent also specifically discusses CCP section 473 and the grounds for relief pursuant to that provision, which the two prior motions failed to present. Respondent also now satisfies the basic requirements for relief under CCP section 473 by presenting a proposed response as well as required financial disclosures. The facts and explanation presented are partly similar, but partly different, with Respondent now not addressing the service but instead explaining the delays in preparing his response to the petition, which he did not clearly present in the prior motions.

Application of CCP Section 1008

Despite the similarities in the relief and underlying facts between this motion and the two prior motions to quash, the court finds that this motion is not subject to CCP section 1008. The two prior motions were procedurally defective, lacking any points and authorities or reference to the legal grounds for relief. These defects were a part of the court’s decision denying the two prior motions. Moreover, the two prior motions, although discussing facts and issues related to the default and judgment, were expressly noticed solely as motions to quash and, to the extent that the court could determine, were fundamentally based on an effort to quash the service of the summons and petition. This motion is specifically a motion to set aside the default based on CCP section 473(b).

The court notes that Respondent is self-represented and appears to have been unaware of the procedural requirements, specific types of relief available, or how to articulate what he is requesting. Although self-represented litigants must still comply with substantive and procedural requirements, this fact does affect the court’s analysis and approach because the court cannot ignore the realities of what self-represented litigants face.

Vacating the Default Judgment

Respondent presents his evidence in several pages on form declaration pages attached to his RFO with the information regarding the grounds for delay and vacating the default are on the first declaration form attached to the RFO.

He admits that his initial effort to file the response was already more than 10 days after the 30-day deadline for responding but he in fact tried to file it the day before Petitioner entered his default. He also explains now that he received notice of the petition by about January 22, 2026, and states that he “immediately began attempting to collect documents and pertinent information in order to respond to the Petitioner in a timely manner.” He explains that it took him a long time to locate and collect the information and documents needed for the various financial disclosures and assertions because the parties own a family corporation with various overlapping finances regarding loans, real property, vehicles, pending litigation, and extensions for filing income tax.

He states that he eventually realized that he could not obtain all the documents and information prior to filing a response and at that point tried to file his response. He prepared his response and related financial disclosures, which he attaches as exhibits to the RFO. These are dated February 24, 2026. He now explains that when he tried to file and serve his response on February 25, 2026, Petitioner was not at her place of work, the attempted service location, and the person serving the response accordingly left the papers at Petitioner’s place of work with her coworkers. He includes a copy of the proof of service from the server, dated February 25, 2026, showing personal service at Petitioner’s place of work on that day at 3:35 p.m. He has already explained that he tried to file the response earlier that day only to be told that he needed to serve it first. He again explains that when he tried to file the response at the courthouse after causing service on Petitioner, at 3:28 p.m., he was told that the clerk’s office had closed for the day. He returned the next day to file the response only to be told that Petitioner had just entered a default, which the court record shows was indeed on that day, February 26, 2026.

The court notes that the facts presented now explain, rather than conflict with, what Respondent had been presenting in the prior motions. Previously, Respondent had focused on quashing service on him and presented information about the service. He had alluded to the time needed to prepare his responsive papers but had presented no actual facts or explanation regarding why it took him so long to try to file his response and had not indicated when he had received notice of the petition. Respondent’s information regarding his effort to serve Petitioner at her place of work similarly clarifies the situation. Respondent had, in the motions to quash, stated that he went to Petaluma to serve the documents personally on Petitioner at her place of work. He provided no other information in the motions to quash, so the court found that it lacked credibility in light of Petitioner’s evidence showing that she was out of town on that specific day. Respondent now clarifies that he had one Lee J. Deslippe (“Deslippe”) actually serve the documents and he provides the signed and dated proof of service. This is dated February 25, 2026, as noted above. He also explains that he had the documents personally delivered but that, since Petitioner was not there, Deslippe them left them at Petitioner’s workplace. This is consistent with both his prior, albeit vague, explanation, and Petitioner’s assertion that she was not there that day.

Petitioner contends that she could not have been personally served, and Deslippe did not hand the documents to her, because she was not there at the time. However, while “personal service” for purposes of a summons and complaint or petition ordinarily requires the recipient to actually receive the documents in person, that is not ordinarily required for service of other documents. Personal service of the type required for a summons and complaint or petition only applies to those documents; it does not apply to other documents such as a response or answer. CCP section 415.10. Therefore, in this context “personal service” may mean simply personal physical delivery instead of other methods, such as mailing. The fact that Petitioner was not present and did not physically receive the response in person accordingly neither renders the service defective nor demonstrates a conflict in Respondent’s evidence or proof of service.

Under the circumstances, the court finds Respondent’s request to set aside the default judgment sufficiently credibility and persuasive. The court GRANTS the motion.

Conclusion

Motion GRANTED. Respondent must file his Response to Petition for Dissolution within 30 days of today’s hearing.

Respondent shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

3. SFL089490, Homer Dissolution

Motion to Compel Further Responses and Sanction DENIED without prejudice as explained in this ruling.

Facts

Petitioner originally filed this action for legal separation on October 13, 2021, but on January 18, 2024, filed an amended petition for dissolution of marriage. There are two children, one of whom is still a minor (the “Child”).

The matter is currently set for an evidentiary trial regarding support on October 12 and 19, 2026.

Respondent filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions. The court issued a tentative ruling prior to the hearing of September 11, 2026, finding the matter to be moot and denying the request for sanctions. No party appeared to contest that ruling, which the court therefore adopted as its order.

Discovery

As set forth in the Melissa Homer Declaration (the “Melissa Dec.”) attached to Respondent’s RFO and Motion to Compel Further Responses and Sanction, Respondent served Petitioner on June 6, 2026, with special interrogatories and requests for production (collectively, the “Discovery”). Respondent received the responses on July 6, 2026, but felt that the responses were deficient and failed to include mandatory financial disclosures. Respondent sent a meet-and-confer e-mail to Petitioner on August 8, 2026, specifying the claimed defects and seeking new responses by August 17, 2026. However, Petitioner had not responded to the e-mail or provided new Discovery responses by the time Respondent filed her motion to compel.

Motion

In her RFO and Motion to Compel Further Responses and Sanction, Respondent moves the court to compel Petitioner to provide further responses to the discovery. She also seeks monetary sanctions of $500.

Petitioner opposes the motion. He contends that at the time Respondent served the Discovery, Respondent knew that he was incarcerated with an anticipated release date of June 17, 2026, and he had limited ability to access records or obtain documents and information needed for the responses. He asserts that he made efforts to work with his attorney to complete the responses, which were served on July 6, 2026, and in those responses, he provided what information he was able to obtain and provide at that time. He argues that after his release, he worked with his attorney to update the responses and he is presently completing supplemental responses to the Discovery. He also argues that Respondent’s separate statement for the motion fails to set forth all his responses completely and accurately. Finally, he argues that Respondent failed to make the mandatory efforts to meet and confer prior to filing this motion.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided. This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

When a propounding party is dissatisfied with responses to interrogatories or requests for production or inspection (“RFP”), that party may move to compel further responses. CCP sections 2030.300, 2031.310. The moving party must make adequate attempts to meet and confer. Ibid. Generally, once a timely, proper motion to compel further responses has been made, the responding party has the burden to justify objections or incomplete answers. Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.

A party moving to compel further responses to a production request must demonstrate “good cause" for seeking the items. CCP section 2031.310(b)(1). This requires a showing that the items are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and a showing of specific facts justifying discovery. Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117. Whether there is an alternative source for the information is relevant though not dispositive. Associated Brewers Distrib. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 588. Once the moving party demonstrates good cause, the responding party must justify its objections. Kirkland v. Sup.Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.

A party has a duty to provide “complete” responses and to make them as straightforward as possible. CCP sections 2030.220; 2031.210-2031.230. Requests must be answered to the extent possible and an answer that contains only part of the information requested or which evades a meaningful response is improper. Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.

It is also not proper to respond by simply referring to other documents such as a deposition transcript. Deyo, supra. If a party does refer to other documents, it should generally also specify the source and summarize the information to make the response itself complete. Ibid.

A responding party has a duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to obtain the requested information and if it is unable to comply, it must state that it made a reasonable and diligent search. CCP sections 2030.220 2031.230; Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 783.

CCP section 2031.220 governs a statement of compliance with a production request. It states, in full,

A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.

CCP section 2031.230 governs responses containing a statement of inability to comply. It states, in pertinent part,

A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand… shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.

The responding party must verify substantive responses but not objections. CCP section 2030.250. Where a substantive response is unverified, the response is ineffective and is the equivalent of no response at all. See Appleton v Sup.Ct. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. However, a party need not verify responses consisting solely of objections, which only the attorney must sign. CCP section 2030.250(a), (c); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 339, 344.

Where a party has failed to respond to a request for production or the responses are considered inadequate, the first step is not to compel production but, as with interrogatories, to compel a response, and only once a party has obtained a response agreeing to produce items may the party seek production in compliance with that response. CCP §§ 2031.300, 2031.310, 2031.320.

The discovery methods of serving a request for production and a deposition notice requiring production are separate and a party may seek information via both depositions and written discovery, even if arguably duplicative. See Carter v. Sup.Ct. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997. For example, where a party seeks to obtain documents via both deposition and requests for production, using one method “does not prescribe a waiver of the party’s right to use other discovery methods for obtaining the same documents or information.” Carter, 997.

CRC 3.1345 requires a separate statement of items in dispute on a discovery motion other than one where there has been no responses. CRC 3.1345(a) expressly states, “Except as provided in (b), any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement.” Subdivision (b) states that no such statement is required on a motion to compel where there has been no response, or where the court has allowed a party to submit a “concise outline” in lieu of a separate statement. The separate statement must specifically set forth the full text of each request at issue; the full response, if any; the factual and legal reasons supporting the party’s argument; and other specified information as necessary. Subdivision (d) adds, “A motion concerning interrogatories, inspection demands, or admission requests must identify the interrogatories, demands, or requests by set and number.”

Meeting and Conferring

Petitioner claims that Respondent failed to meet and confer in good faith, but the matter is unclear. Respondent shows that she sent a meet-and-confer message identifying the claimed defects. There is no indication that she needed to do more or that Petitioner had replied to that. Absent other evidence on the issue, Respondent appears to have made a sufficient effort to meet and confer under the circumstances.

Substantive Discussion

Respondent provides a separate statement in which she sets forth the items and responses in dispute. However, Petitioner correctly notes that the separate statement does not set forth his responses at all. Respondent merely generally describes the interrogatory responses in her own words and only to the extent that she identifies the alleged defects. She also does not even provide the RFP responses and instead merely generally describes the documents produced. The court is therefore unable to rule on the merits of this motion.

Petitioner also demonstrates that he is currently preparing further responses and explains the delays in doing so.

Under the circumstances, the court finds it appropriate to DENY the motion without prejudice to Respondent bringing a new motion addressing the latest discovery responses and setting forth a sufficient separate statement complying with the law set forth above.

Sanctions

For compelling further responses, the court shall impose monetary sanctions on the losing party unless that party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make sanctions unjust. CCP sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2031.310. To obtain sanctions, the moving party must state in the notice of motion that the party is seeking sanctions, identify against whom the party seeks the sanctions, and specify the kind of sanctions. CCP section 2023.040. Sanctions are limited to the “reasonable expenses” related to the motion. Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.

The sanctions which pro-per, or self-represented, litigants may recover is limited to out-of-pocket costs such as paying for legal research, copies, transportation, and the like. Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4^th 1173, 1179.

Fam. Code section 271 broadly authorizes the court to make an award of attorney’s fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” and “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this code,” based on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” The party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs on this basis is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

Respondent has demonstrated no basis for the sanctions. She is self-represented and not entitled to attorney’s fees. The motion is defective as well. Finally, Respondent has not shown a basis for sanctions pursuant to Fam. Code section 271 while Petitioner explains his efforts to comply.

The court DENIES the sanctions request.

Conclusion

The court DENIES the motion without prejudice as explained above. Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

4. SFL088123, County of Sonoma v Whitten

Other Parent’s Request for Order is dropped from the court’s calendar for failure to timely serve the Request for Order on DCSS and Respondent and failure to timely file the requisite Proofs of Service with the court.

5. SFL079668, Honey Dissolution

Motion for Enforcement of Equalization Judgment and Retirement Division DENIED, partly without prejudice, and partly with prejudice, as detailed below. The court denies the motion in full and with prejudice as to the requested orders regarding the CalPERS Plan, information regarding that plan, and QDRO issues, those orders numbered 6, 7, and 8, in the requested orders listed in the motion. In all other respects, the motion is denied without prejudice as explained below.

Facts

Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor children on April 24, 2018. The children are no longer minors.

The court entered judgment of dissolution (the “Judgment”) on January 17, 2019. The Judgment was based on, and incorporated, an attached martial settlement agreement (“MSA”) between the parties. The Judgment states, among other things, that Petitioner is to provide spousal support to Respondent; Petitioner is to make a one-time lump-sum equalization payment to Respondent in the amount of $25,000 (the “Equalization Payment”); establishes a community interest in Petitioner’s Local 38 pension and 401k plans (collectively, the “Local Plans”); and, regarding Petitioner’s CalPERS retirement plan (the “CalPERS Plan”), expressly states that Respondent “specifically disclaims any interest in this property now and forevermore,” awarding Petitioner a “100% interest” in the full amount of that plan.

In June 2024, the parties signed two stipulations, which the court entered as orders, for Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (“QDROs”) for Petitioner’s Local Plans.

On July 13, 2026, the County of Sonoma Department of Child Support Services (“DCSS”) filed a substitution of payee form, noting that it is no longer providing support payments related to this proceeding.

Motion

Respondent moves the court for several orders, which she sets forth specifically and numbered as follows: 1) order Petitioner to pay an outstanding equalization balance plus interest in monthly installments; 2) order interest to accrue at 10% per year on any unpaid balance; 3) allow Respondent to enforce the obligation through wage garnishment, earnings assignment, or other enforcement remedy; 4) order an earnings assignment for the existing spousal support obligations to continue payment following the closure of the DCSS case in June 2026; 5) order Petitioner to provide the name, address, and payroll contact information of his current employer; 6) order Petitioner to provide all information necessary for identifying and dividing his CalPERS Plan; 7) order Petitioner to cooperate in preparing a QDRO or other necessary order to divide community retirement interests; 8) require Petitioner to preserve retirement funds; 9) award her attorney’s fees and costs; and 10) an other relief.

On August 31, 2026, the hearing on Respondent’s motion was reset from September 4, 2026, in Department 23 to October 2, 2026, in Department 20 due to the recusal of a judicial officer. The parties were ordered that all briefing remained set for the original September 4^th hearing date.

Petitioner filed a late Responsive Declaration to Request for Order which has not been considered.

Applicable Authority

If a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) was “merged” or “incorporated” into the judgment, it no longer operates as an independent legal instrument so enforcement remedies instead are based exclusively on the judgment. See Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App. 3d 647, 656.

Courts have authority to enforce a judgment, including one which incorporates an MSA. CCP §128 gives the court the power to control the proceedings before it, preserve and enforce order, compel obedience to judgments, orders, etc.; and make orders and process “conform to law and justice.” The court in Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Ass'n v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, at 679, explained,

The inherent power of the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued is well established [Citations]; the court may make discretionary orders with reasonable conditions; and even make subsequent limitations and modifications of prior orders in order to achieve justice [Citation]…"

Courts therefore have inherent power to control judicial proceedings in order to insure orderly administration of justice and to see to it that all persons indulge in no act or conduct calculated to obstruct administration of justice. People v. Smith (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 897.

The rules regarding the period of enforceability and renewal of judgments in the Enforcement of Judgments Law (“EJL”) at CCP section 683.010 et seq. do not limit the court’s discretion when enforcing Family Code judgments and orders. Fam.Code section 291. Accordingly, a money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property made or entered under the Family Code, including a judgment for child, family or spousal support, is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied. Fam.Code section 291(a); Schelb v. Stein (2010) 190 Cal.App. 4th 1440, 1447.

A “money judgment” entered or registered in California is enforceable by writ of execution. CCP §§ 680.230, 699.010, 699.510(a); see, e.g., Songer v. Cooney (1989) 214 Cal.App. 3d 387, 393 (judgment lien on real property enforceable by execution writ); Marriage of Farner (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1370, 1376 (order giving debtor's former spouse percentage of debtor's retirement pay retroactively is money judgment enforceable by execution writ). Any judgment or other court order or decree requiring payment of money is treated as a “money judgment.” CCP §§ 680.230, 680.270.

CCP section 699.010 governs the enforcement of a money judgment via writ of execution. CCP section 699.710 states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all property that is subject to enforcement of a money judgment… is subject to levy under a writ of execution to satisfy a money judgment.” CCP section 695.010, et seq., basically includes all property of a judgment debtor other than non-transferable property, license to engage in business, and certain other limitations which do not seem at issue here.

The court shall issue a writ of execution after entry of a money judgment upon the judgment creditor’s application. CCP §699.510. According to section 699.510(b), (b) “If the judgment creditor seeks a writ of execution to enforce a judgment made, entered, or enforceable pursuant to the Family Code, in addition to the requirements of this article, the judgment creditor shall satisfy the requirements of any applicable provisions of the Family Code.” Afterwards, the judgment creditor may apply for a withholding order. CCP §706.102.

CCP section 699.040(a) states that if a writ of execution is issued, a judgment creditor may apply to the court on a noticed motion for an order directing the debtor to transfer to the levying officer either, or both, possession of the property to be levied upon or possession of documentary evidence of title to the property or debt owed to the judgment debtor.

CCP Part 2, Title 9, Division 2, Chapter 5, at CCP §706.010, et seq., is the “Wage Garnishment Law” and governs wage garnishment and earnings withholding orders. The Wage Garnishment Law (“WGL”) is the exclusive judicial method of compelling an employer to withhold an employee's earnings to satisfy a nonsupport judgment. CCP § 706.020; see California State Employees' Ass'n v. State of Calif. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 374, 377. CCP §706.020 states, in full, “Except for an earning assignment order for support, the earnings of an employee shall not be required to be withheld by an employer for payment of a debt by means of any judicial procedure other than pursuant to this chapter.”

A “withholding order for support” is an earnings withholding order issued to collect delinquent amounts under a judgment for child or spousal support and it must indicate “on its face” that it is a “withholding order for support.” CCP § 706.030(a). Such an order has priority over any other earnings withholding order. CCP § 706.030(c)(2).

An earnings assignment order can be used to collect both arrearages and future installments due under support judgments. See Fam.Code § 5200 et seq.

The official Judicial Council forms generally must be used for all WGL procedures. CCP §§ 706.120, 706.081.

According to CCP section 706.102, where a court has issued a writ of execution in the county where the employer is to be served, and the time for levying on property, in accord with CCP section 699.530, has not expired, a judgment creditor may apply for an earnings withholding order with a levying officer. In other words, a judgment creditor may apply for an earning withholdings order only after a writ of execution has been issued to the county where the judgment debtor’s employer is to be served and the writ has not been outstanding for more than 180 days. CCP § 706.102(a).

Fam. Code § 5208 defines “Earnings assignment order for support” as “an order that assigns to an obligee a portion of the earnings of a support obligor due or to become due in the future.”

According to CCP section 695.020(a), “[c]ommunity property is subject to enforcement of a money judgment as provided in the Family Code.” Subdivision (b) adds that:

Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, if community property that is subject to enforcement of a money judgment is sought to be applied to the satisfaction of a money judgment:

(1) Any provision of this division that applies to the property of the judgment debtor or to obligations owed to the judgment debtor also applies to the community property interest of the spouse of the judgment debtor and to obligations owed to the other spouse that are community property.

(2) Any provision of this division that applies to property in the possession or under the control of the judgment debtor also applies to community property in the possession or under the control of the spouse of the judgment debtor.

A qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) recognizes the existence of an “alternate payee’s” right to benefits payable from a qualified plan. The QDRO can take the form of a judicial order, including approval of a property settlement agreement, relating to provision of child support, spousal support, or marital property rights to an alternate payee and is made pursuant to state domestic relations law. IRC § 414(p)(1) & (8); 29 USC § 1056(d)(3)(B) & (K); see Marriage of Shelstead (1998) 66 Cal.App. 4th 893, 902.

Points and Authorities

Respondent presents no memorandum of points and authorities. CRC 3.1112(a) states that the “required papers” for motions include a “memorandum in support.” CRC 3.1113(a), governing memoranda in support of motions, likewise states that, aside from express exceptions, a party filing a motion “must serve and file a supporting memorandum. The court may construe the absence of a memorandum as an admission that the motion or special demurrer is not meritorious and cause for its denial….” The memorandum “must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced.” CRC 3.1113(b).

This is not merely a technical defect, but one which prevents the court from fully understanding the relief requested, the legal grounds for the relief, or the standards which the court must apply. This result is that the court is unable to decide on the merits of those parts of the motion which are not clearly groundless, as discussed below.

The court DENIES the motion without prejudice on this basis, except as explained below.

Discussion

CalPERS and QDRO Issues

Respondent seeks information needed to “divide” the CalPERS Plan and establish a QDRO for it. She explains that this has not been completed and that she was only able to complete the QDROs for the Local Plans.

The motion is groundless on these points. As noted above, the Judgment, through the MSA, expressly states that Respondent “specifically disclaims any interest in [the CalPERS Plan] now and forevermore,” awarding Petitioner a “100% interest” in it. Respondent therefore has no basis for claiming any interest in that plan, dividing it, or establishing a QDRO regarding it. She therefore also has no basis for obtaining any information regarding it. There is no other remaining QDRO issue since the record shows, as noted above, that the court already entered QDROs on the other plans and Respondent expressly admits this in her motion.

The court DENIES the motion in full and with prejudice as to the requested orders regarding the CalPERS Plan, information regarding that plan, and QDRO issues. In other words, the court denies the motion as to items 6-8 in her list of requested orders. Because the court denied the motion with prejudice on these points, Petitioner may not again seek the relief requested as to these points in a subsequent motion without complying with the requirements of CCP section 1008. The court denies the motion with prejudice on these points because the record is clear that, regardless of whatever legal bases or authority Respondent may raise, factually it is clear from the record that the motion has no basis for the requested orders on these points.

Equalization Payment, Spousal Support, Wage Garnishment or Other Enforcement

With respect to the remaining issues of the Equalization Payment, unpaid spousal support, and requests to enforce these through wage garnishment, withholdings, or the like, the motion may have persuasive factual bases. However, as noted, Respondent has failed to set forth the legal authority and ground, the legal relief sought, or the legal standards which may apply. Moreover, as indicated above as well, Respondent must follow certain procedures, such as obtaining a writ of execution, to enforce money judgments, and she has failed to comply with those procedures. Respondent must follow the required procedures set forth in the applicable authority, partly detailed above. The court also DENIES the motion as to these issues without prejudice partly on this basis.

Conclusion

The court DENIES the motion, partly with prejudice and partly without prejudice, as set forth above.