Family Law Tentative Rulings

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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1. 24FL01767 JONES DISSOLUTION

Due to calendaring error, the matter has been continued to January 14, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in Department 22 to be heard on the Domestic Calendar. No tentative ruling will be issued.  Appearances are required on January 14, 2026.

2. 24FL02075 COLIN DISSOLUTION

Motion to Bifurcate and Terminate Marital Status CONTINUED to the law and motion calendar of February 13, 2026, in Department 22 at 9:30 a.m. to allow Petitioner to provide the missing FL-347 form, completed and filled out, along with related missing information regarding the retirement or pension plans.  Petitioner must demonstrate that the plans need not be joined, or must join them, and must specify the type of order, i.e., FL-347 order 3a (1), 3a (2), or 3a (3), which he seeks. 

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage without minor children on October 10, 2024.  Respondent filed her response on November 8, 2024.  Petitioner filed his declaration regarding service of his preliminary declaration of disclosure on January 28, 2025, and Respondent filed her own such declaration as well as an income and expense declaration on July 9, 2025.  Otherwise, very little has occurred in this proceeding since then.  Petitioner’s attorney substituted out of this action on December 2, 2025, and both parties are currently self-represented. 

Motion

            In his Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Bifurcate and Terminate Marital Status, Petitioner moves the court to bifurcate the issue of marital status from other issues and enter a judgment for termination of the marriage only. 

            Respondent has filed an opposition to the motion, but her opposition discusses solely her claims for spousal support.  She does not appear to oppose bifurcation or termination of status of marriage, or address other issues specifically raised in the motion. 

Applicable Law

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of CCP section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).           

            Marital dissolution actions may be “bifurcated” for an early “status-only” judgment, reserving jurisdiction over all other issues.  Fam. Code section 2337.  Upon noticed motion, the court may sever, or bifurcate, the issue of marital status from other issues and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of dissolution of marriage status, i.e., a “status only” judgment, expressly reserving jurisdiction of all other pending issues for a later determination.  Fam.Code section 2337(a), (f); see Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 889, 894; Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 Cal.App. 3d 742, 755.  According to Fam. Code section 2337(c)(5),

Until judgment has been entered on all remaining issues and has become final, the party shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any adverse consequences to the other party if the bifurcation results in the loss of the other party's rights with respect to any retirement, survivor, or deferred compensation benefits under any plan, fund, or arrangement, or to any elections or options associated therewith, to the extent that the other party would have been entitled to those benefits or elections as the spouse or surviving spouse of the party.

A party should request bifurcation request on the FL-300 Request for Order form with attached FL-315 Request or Response to Request for Separate Trial form.  CRC 5.390(a).  The moving party must also serve a preliminary declaration of disclosure (PDD”) with the motion unless the party has already done so.  Fam.Code section 2337(b).  According to CRC 5.390(a), “A party requesting a separate trial or responding to a request for a separate trial must complete Application or Response to Application for Separate Trial (form FL-315).”  Emphasis added.

            The Judicial Council has adopted a form FL-340 Findings and Order After Hearing cover sheet as well as form attachment FL-347 for an order granting a status-only bifurcation request.  However, the FL-180 form for judgments also applies and includes options for bifurcation and reservation of remaining issues.  FL-347 reflects the Family Code conditions for bifurcation of the status of marriage or domestic partnership.  Form FL-347 section 3 sets forth the court’s orders regarding retirement plans. 

Following this recitation of orders, the form requires the court to list each retirement plan and the type of order, i.e., 3a (1), 3a (2), or 3a (3), which the court is making for that plan. 

Form FL-347 section 3 sets forth the court’s orders regarding retirement plans.  It states,

To preserve the claims of each party in all retirement plan benefits on entry of judgment granting a dissolution of the status of the marriage or domestic partnership, the court makes one of the following orders for each retirement plan in which either party is a participant:

(1) A final domestic relations order or qualified domestic relations order under Family Code section 2610 disposing of each party's interest in retirement plan benefits, including survivor and death benefits.

(2) An interim order preserving the nonemployee party's right to retirement plan benefits, including survivor and death benefits, pending entry of judgment on all remaining issues.

(3) A provisional order on Pension Benefits—Attachment to Judgment (form FL-348) incorporated as an attachment to the judgment of dissolution of the status of marriage or domestic partnership (Judgment (Family Law) (form FL-180)). This order provisionally awards each party a one-half interest in all retirement benefits attributable to employment during the marriage or domestic partnership.

Following this recitation of orders, the form requires the court to list each retirement plan and the type of order, i.e., 3a (1), 3a (2), or 3a (3), which the court is making for that plan.

            In FL-347 section 3, therefore, the court is supposed to list, and make an order for, every retirement plan in which either party is participating.  Section 3’s first paragraph concludes by stating, with emphasis added, “the court makes one of the following orders for each retirement plan in which either party is a participant:” The list which follows is for the court to identify all of the plans and which type of the three possible orders is being made for each plan.

            Form FL-347 item 5.e reflects the language in section 2337(c)(5) regarding retirement plans and the like.  It states, in full,

Except for any retirement plan, fund, or arrangement identified in any order issued and attached as set out in paragraph 3, until judgment has been entered on all remaining issues and has become final, the must indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any adverse consequences to the other party if the bifurcation results in the loss of the other party's rights with respect to any retirement, survivor, or deferred compensation benefits under any plan, fund, or arrangement, or to any elections or options associated with them, to the extent that the other party would have been entitled to those benefits or elections as the spouse or surviving spouse or the domestic partner or surviving domestic partner of the moving party.

Accordingly, the court is required to list all retirement plans in which one or both parties is a participant and identify which kind of order it is issuing for each plan.

            The moving party has the burden to ensure all retirement accounts have been addressed, whether to join them or not, and further to include them in the forms. If they cannot do that, the Court can deny the request to bifurcate status, as there is a risk to the other party’s interest in those accounts.

Discussion

            Petitioner meets the fundamental procedural requirements for this motion.  He presents the motion on the appropriate FL-300 form and properly attaches the FL-315.  He also earlier filed a declaration showing service of his PDD on Respondent.

            The motion seeks bifurcation and adjudication solely of marital status, with termination of the marriage.  All other issues Petitioner requests be reserved for later determination. 

            Petitioner identifies three pension or retirement plans at issue, one of his and two of Respondent’s.  FL-315, section 1(e)(2).  He requests that until judgment becomes final each party must indemnify and hold harmless the other from any adverse consequences.

            Petitioner has not provided a proposed FL-347, which should include details for the order regarding any pension or retirement plans, and he has not clearly indicated how each plan has been addressed either in the proposed order or with respect to whether they have been joined or need not be joined.  The court notes that the record does not show that any such plan has been joined.  Without this information, the court cannot at this time grant the motion. 

            In all other respects, aside from the missing information regarding pensions, the motion is sufficient and persuasive.  Respondent’s opposition papers raise issues outside the scope of this motion, specifically her claim to spousal support, and the court will consider those issues separately.  She presents no basis for denying this motion.  

Conclusion

            The court CONTINUES the motion to allow Petitioner to provide the missing FL-347 form, completed and filled out, along with related missing information regarding the retirement or pension plans.  Petitioner must demonstrate that the plans need not be joined, or must join them, and must specify the type of order, i.e., FL-347 order 3a (1), 3a (2), or 3a (3), which he seeks. 

 3. 25FL00184 COWHIG v. BURNS DISSOLUTION

Motion for Laurie Cowhig to be reaffirmed as Guardian ad Litem GRANTED.

Motion to Bifurcate and Terminate Marital Status GRANTED.

Facts

            This is a consolidated action for dissolution of marriage without minor children. Respondent in this action, Patricia Burns (“Wife”), initially filed an action for legal separation without minor children, case number SFL075648 (the “Separation Action”), on January 4, 2017.  The court entered default and judgment of legal separation, upon Wife’s request, on May 5, 2017. 

            No further litigation occurred until October 2024, when Petitioner in this action, Michael Cowhig (“Husband”) filed an application to appoint Husband’s daughter-in-law, Laurie Cowhig (“Laurie”), as his guardian ad litem (“GAL”) on October 28, 2024.   The GAL application was based in part on a Durable Power of Attorney (the “DPA”) which the papers demonstrated Husband had signed. This named Laurie, the wife of one of Husband’s three children, as his agent and named two of his children, including his son and prior appointee Aaron Cowhig (“Aaron”), as alternate agents.  According to the papers filed on behalf of Husband, Husband’s three adult children, Nicole Delbridge (“Nicole”), Laurie’s husband Adam Cowhig (“Adam”), and Aaron (collectively, the “Children”), and Laurie relocated Husband to Montana to live with them and they all agreed to have Laurie take the role in the DPA following Husband’s recovery from a hospitalization.  See Declaration of Brian Lanz, Attachment to Ex Parte Application/Request for Order filed July 16, 2025 (“Lanz Dec.”); Declaration of Nicole Delbridge filed February 13, 2025, in the Separation Action (“Nicole Dec.”); Declaration of Aaron Cowhig filed February 13, 2025, in the Separation Action (“Aaron Dec.”).  The court granted the application on October 30, 2024.  Husband filed a motion regarding an omitted asset and sale thereof for residential real property (the “Petaluma Property”) which he asserted the parties had jointly purchased.  Wife opposed the motion on the grounds that she had purchased the Petaluma Property with her own separate property and had only put Husband on the title as a “show of good faith.”  The Petaluma Property is the crux of the property dispute in this litigation, with Husband, through his GAL, claiming that the Petaluma Property is community property and that Husband is accordingly entitled to a share of it.   

            Husband then filed this action for dissolution of marriage without minor children (the “Dissolution Action”) on January 24, 2025. 

             After some further litigation, Husband filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Bifurcate and Terminate Marital Status (the “Bifurcation Motion”) on May 14, 2025.

            Subsequently, on July 1, 2025, this court ordered the two cases to be consolidated, with the Dissolution Action as the lead case. 

            According to the parties, they later discovered around early July 2025 that both of their independent medical experts concluded that Husband had not been competent at the time that he executed the DPA appointing Laurie, which was the basis for the GAL appointment.  Husband accordingly filed an RFO and Motion for Laurie Cowhig to be reaffirmed as Guardian ad Litem (the “GAL Motion”) on July 16, 2025. 

            For a variety of reasons, the pending Bifurcation Motion and GAL Motion were both continued to be heard together on November 14, 2025.  The court subsequently continued both motions again, to December 12, 2025, on Wife’s request.

Motions

            In the GAL motion, Husband moves the court to reaffirm Laurie’s appointment as GAL, despite the fact that the parties now both know, and accept, that Husband had been incompetent when he executed the DPA appointing Laurie.

            Wife opposes the motion.  She contends that Laurie exerted undue influence to obtain the DPA, Laurie failed to disclose a conflict of interest in violation of CCP section 372(e), Laurie acted against Husband’s wishes, Laurie has abused her power by blocking Wife’s visits to Husband, and the court should appoint a neutral third-party fiduciary instead. 

            Husband replies, challenging Wife’s arguments as to why the court should not appoint Laurie and contending that a third-party GAL is not warranted or financially feasible.

            In the Bifurcation Motion, Husband moves the court to bifurcate the issue of marital status and enter a judgment of dissolution on status only, reserving the remaining issues.  His motion contends that he informed Laurie and his Children in July 2024 that he wanted a divorce, and that it is clear from the litigation history that the parties are not able to reconcile, while Wife is using the fat that thye are still legally married for her own advantage.

            Wife opposes the motion, contending that the GAL cannot seek dissolution on behalf of Husband because he is not competent to seek dissolution himself and failed to indicate such a desire before he lost competency. 

General Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022.

GAL Motion

Applicable Authority

            A spouse, domestic partner, or other party who is under a conservatorship or otherwise lacks legal capacity to make decisions must appear through a guardian or conservator of the estate “or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action… is pending, or by a judge thereof.”  CCP section 372(a)(1); Marriage of Caballero (1994) 27 Cal.App. 4th 1139, 1148; see also Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 643 (citing the requirement under CCP section 372 that one, such as a conserved person, lacks capacity to appear on that person’s own behalf and must appear through a guardian, conservator, or guardian ad litem).             

            In fact, any complaint, dissolution petition, or other motions, pleadings, and documents filed by an “incompetent” spouse for whom a conservator or guardian ad litem has not been appointed are subject to challenge, such as by motion to quash or dismissal, due to lack of competence.  See, e.g., Miller v. Miller (1998) 64 Cal.App. 4th 111, 116 (the trial court properly granted motion to quash a parentage action on the ground that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to pursue the action); Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 643 (pointing out that a where party lacks capacity to appear on that party’s own, no guardian ad litem has currently been appointed, and that party brings claims, those claims “are at risk of dismissal” unless the court appoints a guardian ad litem).  

            According to CCP section 372(2)(A), the court or judge may appoint a guardian ad litem in any case when the court or judge deems it “expedient to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the [person] notwithstanding that the person may have a guardian or conservator of the estate and may have appeared by the guardian or conservator of the estate.”  Subdivision (B) sets forth the requirements for appointing a guardian ad litem for a person who already “has a guardian or conservator of the estate,” stating, the application may be granted only if all of the following occur:

(i) The applicant gives notice and a copy of the application to the guardian or conservator of the estate upon filing the application.

(ii) The application discloses the existence of a guardian or conservator of the estate.

(iii) The application sets forth the reasons why the guardian or conservator of the estate is inadequate to represent the interests of the proposed ward in the action.

(C) The guardian or conservator of the estate shall have five court days from receiving notice of the application to file any opposition to the application.

            The court explained in Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36, at 47, that a ‘court has broad discretion in ruling on a guardian ad litem application. [Citation.]  “‘In the absence of a conflict of interest ..., the appointment is usually made on application only and involves little exercise of discretion.’” [Citation.]’

            The party who lacks legal capacity to make decisions remains the “real party in interest” but lacks capacity to maintain or defend the action without the guardian or conservator of the estate acting on the party’s behalf.  CCP section 372(a)(1); Marriage of Caballero, 1148 & fn.5 (decided under former law); McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App. 4th 540, 54.  Accordingly, the court retains supervisory authority over the GAL and can rescind or modify any action taken by the GAL that is contrary to the incapacitated person's legitimate interests.  Carachure v. Scott (2021) 70 Cal. App. 5th 16, 31.

            As the court explained in Golin, “the role of a guardian ad litem, who is appointed only for purposes of the action, is solely to protect and defend the ward’s interest in the suit. [Citation.]  This is a different role from a guardian or conservator appointed for custody or other purposes under the Probate Code. (D.G. v. Superior Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 535, 545–546, 161 Cal.Rptr. 117.)

            A durable power of attorney does not itself authorize a person to file a petition on behalf of the principal and instead creates a presumption in favor of appointing that person as a guardian ad litem.  Marriage of Caballero (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152-1153.

Preliminary Discussion

            In this case, there is no question that Husband needs a guardian ad litem to represent him in this matter.  Wife makes some opposition to such an appointment, but her opposition to appointing anyone as GAL in the role is feeble and groundless.  Even she acknowledges the possibility in her opposition.  Wife instead is primarily opposed to the specific choice of Laurie as guardian ad litem. 

            The court finds that Husband requires a guardian ad litem in accord with the applicable law set forth above.  The parties themselves both agree that Husband is, and has been for some time, incompetent and unable to make the requisite decisions.  As explained above, such a person requires a guardian or guardian ad litem to represent that person and act for that person in legal matters, including actions for marital dissolutions.  Without a guardian ad litem here, Husband would be wholly without representation or any advocacy for his interests.  Even if he were to act without a guardian ad litem, anything he filed would, as noted above, be subject to challenge on the basis that he requires a guardian ad litem due to lack of capacity.  

            The revelation that Husband was probably not competent at the time of the DPA, making the GAL appointment questionable, is itself not a bar to the current motion and in fact not directly relevant.  Husband, Laurie, and Husband’s attorney of record all acknowledge this problem and have accepted it but, as the moving papers argue, this merely requires the instant motion; it is not itself a basis for denying the motion.  Wife, for her part, appears to recognize this and instead opposes the motion on other grounds.  

General Nature of Wife’s Arguments

            Wife’s argument in opposition are generally based on her claims that there are conflicts between Husband and Laurie, that Laurie is exerting undue influence over Husband, and that Laurie is generally acting, or disposed to act, contrary to Husband’s interests.  The court notes that oddity of this position, since it is inherently not based on, and cannot be based on, any direct interest of, or conflict with, Wife herself.  This is in contrast to others who may have an interest in Husband’s finances or wellbeing, and who are not in an adversarial relationship with Husband.  The Children, for example, are natural parties who would clearly have a basis for raising the issues of whether Laurie has a conflict of interest, but they are the very ones who have all agreed to have Laurie act on their behalf.  The court notes that the two siblings of Laurie’s husband Adam, Nicole and Aaron, have submitted declarations expressly supporting this motion and Laurie’s role. 

            That said, the parties do not address this issue in any way.  The court therefore addresses the substantive merits of Wife’s arguments based on the assumption that she may raise them and properly bring them before the court.  The court further notes, however, that this problem in which Wife’s arguments are based on the claims that Laurie interests are contrary to Husband’s, inherently weakens the persuasiveness of Wife’s arguments.   

Undue Influence

            Wife contends that the court should reject Laurie as GAL because she obtained the DPA appointment by undue influence.  She notes that Laurie and the Children obtained Husband’s signature on the DPA after he was released from hospital and she relies on Welfare and Institutions (“W&I”) Code section 15610.70, which defines “undue influence” for purposes of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the “elder Abuse Act”).  Section 15610.70 states, in full,

(a) “Undue influence” means excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person's free will and results in inequity. In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence, all of the following shall be considered:

(1) The vulnerability of the victim. Evidence of vulnerability may include, but is not limited to, incapacity, illness, illness, disability, injury, age, education, impaired cognitive function, emotional distress, isolation, or dependency, and whether the influencer knew or should have known of the alleged victim's vulnerability.

(2) The influencer's apparent authority. Evidence of apparent authority may include, but is not limited to, status as a fiduciary, family member, care provider, health care professional, legal professional, spiritual adviser, expert, or other qualification.

(3) The actions or tactics used by the influencer. Evidence of actions or tactics used may include, but is not limited to, all of the following:

(A) Controlling necessaries of life, medication, the victim's interactions with others, access to information, or sleep.

(B) Use of affection, intimidation, or coercion.

(C) Initiation of changes in personal or property rights, use of haste or secrecy in effecting those changes, effecting changes at inappropriate times and places, and claims of expertise in effecting changes.

(4) The equity of the result. Evidence of the equity of the result may include, but is not limited to, the economic consequences to the victim, any divergence from the victim's prior intent or course of conduct or dealing, the relationship of the value conveyed to the value of any services or consideration received, or the appropriateness of the change in light of the length and nature of the relationship.

(b) Evidence of an inequitable result, without more, is not sufficient to prove undue influence.

            Wife’s argument is not persuasive.  There is no dispute that at the time that Husband executed the DPA, with the following GAL application, he had been diagnosed with dementia, as Nicole admits in her declaration.  However, nothing demonstrates that it was clear that his condition had progressed to the point that he lacked capacity to make the requisite decisions at that time, and Husband’s papers explain that the Children acted then to obtain a DPA before he deteriorated further.  While there is a possible issue regarding this, this conduct does not persuasively demonstrate impropriety.

            The court further notes that under laws of intestate succession, a decedent’s issue are the decedent’s heirs.  Probate Code section 6400, et seq., specifically section 6402.  The Children are therefore Husband’s natural heirs presumptively and they all are acting in agreement in supporting Laurie as GAL.  This contrasts starkly with Wife’s position as an ex-spouse in an adversarial proceeding against Husband.  

            Wife also argues that Laurie has been acting against Husband’s interests in attempting to assert his interest in the Petaluma Property.  She has cited the will and trust which she and Husband’s daughter Nicole allegedly drew up together for Husband, which did not include the Petaluma Property.  However, as Husband’s papers explain, they did not include that because the property title was held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship.  Husband’s papers explain that Nicole, Husband, and the others understood that as a result there was no need or basis for including the property in the will or trust. 

            Wife’s arguments regarding the will and trust are also not a persuasive basis for finding undue influence or conduct against Husband’s interests.  It is in fact at the heart of the litigation over the interests in the Petaluma Property and the mere fact that Husband’s GAL, Children, and attorney, are asserting an interest in it does not demonstrate any conduct against Husband’s interests, undue influence, or other impropriety.   Again, given that the Children are Husband’s default and natural heirs, Wife and Husband are separated and in an adversarial relationship in these proceedings, the position regarding the Petaluma Property as presented in Husband’s filings, and by Laurie and the Children, seems more credible than Wife’s.  Wife’s arguments are not entirely without merit, but they seem less logical, reasonable, and persuasive and again simply do not show impropriety. 

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest

            Wife also argues that Laurie failed to disclose a significant conflict of interest, a basis for rejecting appointment as GAL under CCP section 372(e).  Wife contends that Laurie had been named as an alternate beneficiary under Husband’s trust so that Laurie will inherit the share going to her husband Adam, Husband’s son. 

            This does not demonstrate a conflict of interest.  She is simply a potential heir under the will and trust which Wife and Nicole together prepared.  This simply means that she may inherit from Husband eventually. As the wife of one of Husband’s Children, who are both his designated and natural intestate heirs, there is nothing improper or suspicious about this, especially since she is not acting contrary to the Children but in agreement with them as their chosen representative to act for Husband.  In fact, this arguably indicates that her interests are aligned with Husband’s since it is in the interests of Laurie and the Children to protect Husband’s property interests.  Again, while Wife claims that their position is contrary to what Husband wanted, that dispute as the very issue in this litigation and it seems at least reasonable and persuasive that Husband’s own Children should care for him and be aligned with his interests than a former spouse who is not their mother and who instituted separation proceedings against Husband.

Pursuing Sale of the Petaluma Property

            Wife also contends that in pursuing the sale of the Petaluma Property Laurie and the Children are acting contrary to Husband’s interests.  This is effectively a slightly different variation of the arguments presented above regarding that property.

            As with the basic arguments regarding the Petaluma Property, this is unpersuasive.  The issues regarding the parties’ interests in the property have been addressed above and as explained, do not show a conflict of interest or impropriety.  Wife also argues that nothing shows that the money from the sale is needed to help care for Husband and provide for his needs, citing to his income and medical insurance.  Nicole and Aaron explain, if without much specific detail, the costs of Husband’s care, failed efforts to find an affordable care home, and the need to have Lauren and Adam act as caregivers. They also explain that Laurie and Adam have acted as primary, and at times sole, caregivers to Husband, further explaining the expenses and need for money.   Moreover, details of whether, and to what extent, the money is necessary for Husband’s support are issues which are the subject of this very litigation and also largely beyond the scope of determining whether there is wrongdoing or a conflict of interest which would bar the appointment of Laurie as GAL.

Preventing Wife from Visiting Husband

            Finally, Wife argues that Laurie has abused her power as GAL by preventing Wife from visiting Husband and that Laurie is acting against Husband’s interest by keeping him “isolated” and not letting him have contact with Wife.  She cites to an instance when she went to the care facility at which Husband was residing only to have Laurie and Husband’s attorney inform her that she needed to leave the facility or they would seek a restraining order.

            This argument is unpersuasive.  First, Wife presents no evidence that Husband is “isolated” aside from the fact that Laurie and the Children are not allowing her to visit him.  There is no evidence whatsoever of anything else which could even point to isolation or mistreatment in this regard.  Second, there is no basis for finding any wrongdoing or abuse of power or conflict with Husband’s interests simply because Husband’s own Children have prevented his ex-wife from seeing him.  The court again notes the basically adversarial position between Husband and Wife in these proceedings, the fact that Wife commenced the proceedings by seeking separation, and the natural bond between Husband and his Children, for whom Laurie is simply acting as agent by their agreement.  Third, the issue of Laurie and the Children preventing Wife from visiting Husband is not truly related to the position of GAL.  Husband is living in the care of the Children, and specifically Laurie and her husband, and this conduct is ultimately unrelated to the position of GAL.  Nothing indicates abuse of that position while appointment of a different person as GAL would in of itself have no direct bearing on whether the Children allowed Wife to visit Husband. 

Feasibility of a Third-Party GAL

            Finally, Husband’s papers contend that it is not sufficiently feasible to appoint a third party as GAL.  They note the expenses of caring for Husband and the only asset at issue in this dispute is the Petaluma Property.  This is not a particularly large estate at issue.  The court agrees that, particularly given the wholly unpersuasive showing of any conflict of interest or wrongdoing which might be a basis for rejecting Laurie as GAL, there is insufficient justification for incurring the expense of a third-party GAL in this case.

Conclusion: GAL Motion

            The court GRANTS the motion to reaffirm Laurie as guardian ad litem.

Bifurcation Motion

            Marital dissolution actions may be “bifurcated” for an early “status-only” judgment, reserving jurisdiction over all other issues.  Fam. Code section 2337.  Upon noticed motion, the court may sever, or bifurcate, the issue of marital status from other issues and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of dissolution of marriage status, i.e., a “status only” judgment, expressly reserving jurisdiction of all other pending issues for a later determination.  Fam.Code section 2337(a), (f); see Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 889, 894; Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 Cal.App. 3d 742, 755.  According to Fam. Code section 2337(c)(5),

Until judgment has been entered on all remaining issues and has become final, the party shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless from any adverse consequences to the other party if the bifurcation results in the loss of the other party's rights with respect to any retirement, survivor, or deferred compensation benefits under any plan, fund, or arrangement, or to any elections or options associated therewith, to the extent that the other party would have been entitled to those benefits or elections as the spouse or surviving spouse of the party.

A party should request bifurcation request on the FL-300 Request for Order form with attached FL-315 Request or Response to Request for Separate Trial form.  CRC 5.390(a).  The moving party must also serve a preliminary declaration of disclosure with the motion unless the party has already done so.  Fam.Code section 2337(b).  According to CRC 5.390(a), “A party requesting a separate trial or responding to a request for a separate trial must complete Application or Response to Application for Separate Trial (form FL-315).”  Emphasis added.

            In CCP section 372, governing appearances by those lacking capacity, subdivision (a)(3) states, in pertinent part,

The… guardian ad litem so appearing… shall have power, with the approval of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compromise the same, to agree to the order or judgment to be entered therein for or against the ward or conservatee, and to satisfy any judgment or order in favor of the ward or conservatee or release or discharge any claim of the ward or conservatee pursuant to that compromise.

            Wife relies on In re Mariage of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342, at 352, for the proposition that a guardian ad litem may not seek dissolution of marriage on behalf of a party who lacks the requisite capacity unless that party had demonstrated a desire for dissolution when competent, quoting language purportedly from that case.

            The court finds it appropriate to clarify that although the cited language is in fact from a decision, Wife cites entirely the wrong case.  The cited case does not contain the language she cites and did not even address the issues of a guardian ad litem.  The language is instead from In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476.  There, the court, at 483, stated that a petition for dissolution of marriage “may be brought on behalf of a spouse under conservatorship by and through his or her guardian ad litem, provided it is established that the spouse is capable of exercising a judgment, and expressing a wish, that the marriage be dissolved on account of irreconcilable differences and has done so.”

            As explained in De Los Santos v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 677, at 683, the role of the guardian ad litem is to protect the rights of the incompetent person and accordingly the guardian ad litem “has the right to control the lawsuit on the [incompetent person’s] behalf.”  As a result, “[a]mong [the GAL’s] powers are the right to compromise or settle the action (Code Civ.Proc., § 372), to control the procedural steps incident to the conduct of the litigation [Citation], and, with the approval of the court, to make stipulations or concessions that are binding on the [incompetent], provided they are not prejudicial to the latter’s interests [Citation].”  De Los Santos, 684. 

            In the words of In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, at 1454, “a guardian ad litem’s role is more than an attorney’s but less than a party’s. The guardian may make tactical and even fundamental decisions affecting the litigation but always with the interest of the guardian’s charge in mind.  Specifically, the guardian may not compromise fundamental rights, including the right to trial, without some countervailing and significant benefit.”

            Citing In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476, the court in In re Marriage of Caballero (1994) 27 Cal.App. 4th 1139, at 1150, stated, “a petition for dissolution of marriage may be brought on behalf of a spouse, who is under conservatorship, by and through the spouse’s guardian ad litem.”  [Citation.]  Upon her own petition, the wife had been adjudicated an incompetent person two weeks after the marriage and a conservator had been appointed. The court held that the guardian ad litem could file a petition for dissolution on behalf of the wife, “provided it is established that the spouse is capable of exercising a judgment, and expressing a wish, that the marriage be dissolved on account of irreconcilable differences and has done so.”   The court added, at footnote 8,

It has been suggested either a dissolution or legal separation can be obtained by an incompetent spouse under the new statutes: “The Family Law Act, by eliminating the fault grounds and the adversary nature of the proceedings ... permits a reexamination of both rules; i.e., the objects and effects of dissolution and legal separation are now so similar that it is difficult to see why an incompetent spouse could not seek either method of termination of marriage.” [Citation.]

            According to 4 Witkin Cal.Proc. 6th (March 2025 Update) Pleading, section 70,

“Although older cases had held that a guardian or guardian ad litem could not maintain an action for divorce on behalf of his or her incompetent ward [Citation], the modern rule allows it.”  As a result, a spouse may petition for dissolution through a guardian ad litem as long as the spouse is ‘“capable of exercising a judgment, and expressing a wish, that the marriage be dissolved on account of irreconcilable differences and has done so.” [Citations.]’

            In this case, the court finds there to be sufficient evidence that Husband had expressed a desire for dissolution and that dissolution is appropriate under the circumstances.  Husband’s moving papers, in Laurie’s declaration, explain that in around June or July 2024, when he moved to Montana to live with his Children, he “made it clear” to them and Laurie, the wife of his son Adam, that he wanted a divorce and asked his Children to achieve that.  Otherwise, much of the evidence is undisputed and from the face of the court record.  This includes the facts that the parties were already separated and had been for some time; Husband had moved away from the property on which the parties we reliving and in fact had moved out of California to live with his Children; Laurie, the GAL, has presented the motion for bifurcation and dissolution for not on her own and, as discussed in the GAL motion, has been acting with the full support of all of Husband’s Children; and the only one who contends that Husband did not want a dissolution is Wife, who herself initiated the separation proceedings and is in a direct adversarial relationship with Husband.  The context thus includes an already ongoing separation proceeding and property dispute, as opposed to a GAL simply seeking dissolution out of the blue with no supporting context or evidence showing the conservatee's intent. 

            Wife acknowledges the evidence from Laurie showing that Husband indicated a desire for dissolution but counters it only by contending that it is not credible for three reasons.  Opposition 3:14-4:4.  She notes that a test in March 2024 indicated impaired working memory, two of the Children filed declarations in support of the dissolution petition but did not mention this fact, and the timing seems suspicious because Husband filed his Request to Adjudicate an Omitted Asset in November 2024 but did not file the dissolution petition until January 2025. 

            Wife is correct that the facts she cites could weigh against a finding that Husband wanted a dissolution, but they hardly compel such a conclusion and instead simply raise an issue of credibility regarding which this court finds Wife’s argument unpersuasive.  Based on the evidence presented and the context of this matter, as summarized above, the court finds the evidence supporting a desire for dissolution to be credible and persuasive.

            Otherwise, the parties argue over conflicting policies regarding dissolution and again the court finds the motion to be persuasive.  In the context of this matter, with Wife having already commenced the separation proceedings, Husband moving away from her and this state to live with his Children in Montana, and the ongoing property disputes between Husband and Wife, the court finds no basis for denying the request to bifurcate and enter a judgment of dissolution.

            The court GRANTS the motion.    

Conclusion

The prevailing party for each of the above motions shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

4. 25FL01861 DUPRE DISSOLUTION

The matter is continued to further Law and Motion calendar on January 23, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in department 22. No further briefing permitted.

5. SFL71251 WINCH v.  ABONNAT

Motion to Set Aside Temporary Emergency Orders Filed On 10/14 Per Code CCP 473.5 DENIED.

Facts

            On August 24, 2015, Petitioner filed this action to establish Respondent’s parental relationship as the father of her minor child (the “Child”), who was born on April 29, 2014.  Respondent filed a response stating that he is indeed the Child’s father.  The parties continue to litigate over issues including custody and visitation.  On October 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a request for emergency orders to protect the Child from Respondent based on alleged physical abuse and threats of such abuse.  In her request, Petitioner asked for temporary and ultimately permanent sole legal and physical custody of the Child, a Brief Focused Assessment of Respondent, and potentially an order allowing Respondent to have limited supervised visitation with the Child.  That same day, the court issued an emergency temporary order as requested and set a hearing of January 21, 2026, for a final decision (the “Emergency Order”).  

Motion

            In his Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside Temporary Emergency Orders Filed On 10/14 Per Code CCP 473.5, Respondent moves the court to set aside the Emergency Order.  He contends that he was away from his residence when the ex parte application was served at his residence. 

            Petitioner opposes the motion, arguing that service complied with applicable rules. 

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).          

CCP section 473.5 provides the authority for setting aside a default, judgment, or equivalent order where service of the summons did not provide actual notice in time to defend the action.  Section 473.5 provides relief where service may have been proper on the face of the record but did not result in actual notice in time to defend the action.  See Randall v. Randall (1928) 203 Cal.462, 464-465.  The defendant or respondent is thus entitled to relief as long as the party did not receive actual notice and imputed or constructive notice does not suffice.  Rosenthal v. Garner (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 891, 895.  However, the party must show that the lack of notice was not the result of inexcusable neglect or avoidance of service on his or her part.  Tunis v. Barrow (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1077-1078.  Upon finding that defendant lacked notice in time to defend and that the lack of notice was not the result of the defendant’s neglect or avoidance of service, the court may set aside the default or default judgment “on whatever terms as may be just.”  CCP section 473.5(d).

Timeliness of Opposition

Respondent served and filed her opposition late, only 9 calendar days before the hearing.  Unless other specified, papers opposing a motion or demurrer must be served and filed at least 9 court days before the hearing, unless the court permits a shorter time. CCP section1005(b); CRC 3.1300(a).  The court must therefore disregard the opposition.  However, because the motion is substantively unpersuasive, as discussed below, this has no effect on the outcome of this motion. 

Discussion

            Respondent admits that Petitioner served him with the papers for her ex parte emergency request on Monday, October 13, 2025, and that she served the papers at his residence.  He merely claims that he was not at the residence at the time so that his roommate received them.  This service was proper since and in compliance with the rules governing ex parte applications, including CRC 3.1204 and 3.1206 and Local Rule 9.12.  No authority requires that ex parte applications be served personally in compliance with the requirements for service of a summons and complaint or petition.  CCP sections 415.10 through 415.95 and 416.10 through 416.90, which require personal service on the other party as the standard method of service, along with alternatives as allowable per the provisions, apply to service of a summons and complaint or petition.  They do not apply to service of motions or other papers on one already a party to ongoing court proceedings.  By contrast, for example, CCP section 1005, which governs papers related to motions, allows service by simple personal delivery to another party’s address or service by mail, among others.  Respondent therefore fails to show either improper service or lack of proper notice.  Moreover, the Emergency Order only makes temporary orders pending the January hearing.  Respondent clearly, by his statements in his moving papers, has sufficient notice to oppose the requests at that hearing. 

            The court DENIES the motion.

Conclusion

            The court DENIES the motion.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.