Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 22

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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TENTATIVE RULINGS

LAW & MOTION CALENDAR

Friday, May 08 , 2026,  9:30 a.m.

Courtroom 22 –Hon. Robert M. LaForge

3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa

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The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

1.  25FL01823 MILLER V. REYES

Motion to Vacate Order Re: Payment of Mortgage DENIED.

Facts

            Petitioner commenced this action on August 29, 2025 when she filed a request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) against Respondent.  She alleged that the parties were living in a house at 2336 Marsh Court, Santa Rosa (the “Property”) and that both parties owned it “jointly,” but she sought sole use of the Property and asked the court to order Respondent to pay $3,000 a month for the mortgage on the Property. 

            Respondent filed opposition.  In this, he disputed Petitioner’s allegations of abuse and claimed that she also was physically violent with him.  He did not address the Property other than to state that the parties own the Property together and he has not staying there at the time. 

            The court granted a Domestic Violence Temporary Restraining Order (“DVTRO”) on August 29, 2025.  Among other things, it granted Petitioner sole use of the Property pending the DVTRO and ordered Respondent to pay $3,000 per month for the mortgage. 

Motion

            Respondent moves the court to set aside the portion of the DVTRO requiring him to pay $3,000 a month for the mortgage.  He contends that the court had no jurisdiction to order him to pay the mortgage because the parties are not married. 

            Petitioner opposes the motion.  She contends that Family Code section 6324 expressly authorizes the court in such actions to issue temporary orders for use, and payment of obligations on, property.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

            Relief from orders, due to default or otherwise, in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691.  In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 910-911. 

            The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”) at Fam. Code section 6200, et seq., as explained in Fam. Code sections 6203-6218, and 6221, applies to claims of domestic violence against:

(a) A spouse or former spouse.

(b) A cohabitant or former cohabitant, as defined in Section 6209.

(c) A person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.

(d) A person with whom the respondent has had a child, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child of the female parent under the Uniform Parentage Act (Part 3 (commencing with Section 7600) of Division 12).

(e) A child of a party or a child who is the subject of an action under the Uniform Parentage Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child to be protected.

(f) Any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.

As explained in Nicole G. v. Braithwaite (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 990, at 999, ‘[DVPA] exists “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) Under the DVPA, a court is authorized to issue a restraining order enjoining a party from engaging in specific acts of harassment or abuse against a cohabitant or former cohabitant.  [Citations.]’

            Fam. Code section 6324 is part of the DVPA and it expressly authorizes the court to “issue an ex parte order determining the temporary use, possession, and control of real or personal property of the parties and the payment of any liens or encumbrances coming due during the period the order is in effect.”  In Nicole G., supra, petitioner sought and obtained a DVRO against her boyfriend, along with an order that giving petitioner temporary use and possession of the residence.  The boyfriend appealed, claiming that use and ownership of the property should be handled in an ongoing civil suit and that DVRO proceedings could not be used to dispute ownership and control of property.  The court of appeal rejected the boyfriend’s argument and affirmed the decision, explaining, at 999,  ‘The DVPA… authorizes a court to issue a restraining order excluding a person from the “family dwelling” or “common dwelling of both parties” [citations], “on the conditions the court determines,” and “to issue orders determining the temporary use, possession, and control of real or personal property of the parties and the payment of any liens or encumbrances coming due during the period the order is in effect.  [Citation.]”

            Family Code section 271 allows the court to base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” An attorney’s fees award per this section counts as a sanction. Fam. Code § 271(a). In considering the request, the court considers evidence of the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities and will not impose a sanction if it imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction will be imposed. Ibid. The requesting party does not need to demonstrate any financial need, but the award for attorney’s fees can only be imposed after notice and an opportunity to be heard to the party against whom sanctions is proposed. Fam. Code § 271(b). The sanction may be payable from the party against whom the sanction is imposed or the sanctioned party’s share of the community property. Fam. Code § 271(c). Fam. Code § 271 applies to all proceedings under the Family Code. In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1, 6. Conduct that is sanctionable under other statutes and provisions may also be sanctionable under Fam. Code § 271. Ibid. The statute “contemplates assessing a sanction at the end of the lawsuit, when the extent and severity of the party's bad conduct can be judged.” In re Marriage of Quay (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970.

Discussion and Conclusion

            The motion is unpersuasive.  Respondent presents no authority or legal standards for a motion to vacate and fails to explain the fundamental basis for vacating the order.  In any case, as explained above, the Court had express statutory authority to make the order challenged under Family Code § 6324. Respondent’s contentions to the contrary are unsupported.

            The court DENIES the motion. 

            Petitioner requests that the Court grant sanctions of $5,000 under Family Code § 271 for conduct which increased the cost of litigation. The Court does find that the motion itself ignored substantive law and needlessly increased litigation costs. However, the Court finds sanctions at this time inappropriate for two reasons. First, § 271 sanctions are most thoroughly capable of assessment at the end of a suit when the full conduct of the parties in litigation may be considered. In re Marriage of Quay (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970. Second, sanctions are based on attorney’s fees and costs, of which there is no competent evidence in the record at this time. The only evidence submitted is from Petitioner reflecting that she incurred “additional attorney’s fees” responding to the motion. Petitioner’s Responsive Declaration in Opposition, ¶ 23. There is no evidence reflecting the hourly rate of the attorney, the actual time spent, or the resulting total fees incurred. The Court denies the request for sanctions under Family Code § 271 without prejudice to bringing a motion at the conclusion of the case.

            The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.     

***End of Tentative Ruling***